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INTRODUCTION 
On July 10, 2006, negotiators of the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Doha Development Round approved a new WTO 
Transparency Mechanism (Mechanism) for Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs).1  Instead of awaiting the final results of the 
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 1. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is based on the Final Act embodying the results 
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, done at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.  It entered 
into force on January 1, 1995.  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. 
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization has four annexes.  
Annex 1 includes substantive trade rules that are embodied in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Result of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994], the General Agreement on Trade in Services, id. Annex 1B 
[hereinafter GATS] and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, id. Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPS].  Annex 2 consists of the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, id. Annex 2.  Annex 3 contains the 
procedures governing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, id. Annex 3 [hereinafter TPRM], 
the WTO’s peer review system of the trade policies of its Members.  Annex 4 holds the 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements that are binding only on those Members that have accepted 
them.  The agreements in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 are binding on all WTO Members.  See id. 
GATT 1994 is based upon the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947, Oct. 30, 
1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947].  GATT 1947 never formally 
entered into force but found provisional application through the Protocol of Provisional 
Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-2051, 55 
U.N.T.S. 308 [hereinafter Protocol of Provisional Application]. 
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Doha Round, the WTO General Council formally established the 
Mechanism on a provisional basis on December 14, 2006.2  The 
decision on the provisional application of the new Mechanism is 
significant.  It shows the urgency felt by the WTO members for more 
transparency in the creation and functioning of RTAs.  By July 2007, 
no less than 380 RTAs had been notified to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO.3  An additional twenty 
RTAs were estimated to be operational, though not yet notified.4  
From September 2005 to September 2006 alone, thirty-two RTAs 
were notified.5  According to the WTO’s website, Mongolia is the 
only WTO member that is not party to any RTA.6 
This surge in bilateral trade agreements is likely to continue in 
the foreseeable future.7  The rush towards a 21st-century regionalism 
 
The Doha Development Round was launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference 
in Doha, Qatar.  The Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001 gives a mandate for 
negotiations on a range of subjects, including agriculture, services and WTO rules.  WTO, 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).  At 
its meeting on July 27-28, 2006, the WTO’s General Council suspended the deadlocked Doha 
negotiations.  Press Release, WTO, General Council Supports Suspension of Trade Talks, Task 
Force Submits ‘Aid for Trade’ Recommendations (July 27-28, 2006), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/gc_27july06_e.htm.  Later, on November 16, 2006, 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy recommended intensification of the work in the 
Negotiating Groups in Geneva to prepare the ground for the resumption of fully-fledged 
negotiations.  Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Remarks at the Informal TNC (Nov. 16, 
2006), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_dg_stat_16nov06_e.htm. 
For the Doha Development Round Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade 
Agreements, see Press Release, WTO, Lamy Welcomes WTO Agreement on Regional Trade 
Agreements (July 10, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/rta_july06_e.htm.  
For the text of the Transparency Mechanism, see Negotiating Group on Rules, Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, JOB(06)/59/Rev.5 (June 29, 2006) [hereinafter 
WTO Transparency Mechanism for RTAs]. 
 2. Press Release, WTO, General Council Establishes Transparency Mechanism for 
Regional Trade Agreements (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/ 
rta_15dec06_e.htm. 
 3. WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/ 
region_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).  For the texts of the agreements and treaties that have 
been notified to the WTO, see links to the MS Excel tables at WTO, Regional Trade 
Agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
 4. See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, supra note 3. 
 5. See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force: 
Basic Table, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.xls (last visited Nov. 2, 
2007). 
 6. WTO, Regionalism: Friends or Rivals, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/bey1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
 7. International trade economist Richard E. Baldwin speaks about the “domino effect” of 
regionalism.  See generally Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in 
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in Asia has filled hundreds of pages in the recent academic literature.8  
At the same time, older hands at regionalism have been announcing 
renewed efforts in the negotiation of RTAs.  Following the 
suspension of the Doha Development Round in July 2006, the 
European Community (EC) Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson 
declared that he would pursue targeted bilateral trade agreements as 
a part of a wider competitiveness strategy.9  In December 2006, the 
European Commission formally proposed the start of negotiations for 
the creation of free trade agreements with India, South Korea, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Central America 
and the Andean Community.10  The European Commission stated 
that the “bilateral approach would allow the European Union (EU) 
to liberalize tariffs further, to take non-tariff measures better into 
account and to restore a level playing field with our main competitors 
on major markets.”11  United States Trade Representative Susan C. 
Schwab equally underlined that she would pursue an “ambitious 
agenda for bilateral and regional agreements that will broaden and 
deepen trade relations with key, like-minded countries.”12  In fact, 
“[i]n the last five years, [the United States] Congress has approved 
free trade agreements with 12 countries[;] . . . [a]greements with 
 
EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU 25 (Richard E. Baldwin, Pertti Haaparanta & Jaakko 
Kiander eds., 1996). 
 8. See generally NAOKO MUNAKATA, TRANSFORMING EAST ASIA: THE EVOLUTION OF 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (2006); BEYOND JAPAN: THE DYNAMICS OF EAST ASIAN 
REGIONALISM (Peter J. Katzenstein & Takashi Shiraishi eds., 2006); Gary Clyde Hufbauer & 
Yee Wong, Prospects for Regional Free Trade in Asia (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 
05-12, 2005); EDWARD J. LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM (2004); ASIAN 
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 2004); NEW ASIAN REGIONALISM: 
RESPONSES TO GLOBALISATION AND CRISES (Tran Van Hoa & Charles Harvie eds., 2004). 
 9. Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Comm’r, Speech at the London School of Economics: 
Bilateral Agreements in EU Trade Policy 2 (Oct. 9, 2006) (transcript available at European 
Commission Speech/06/574). 
 10. Press Release, European Commission, European Commission Requests Negotiating 
Mandates for Bilateral Trade Agreements with India, South Korea, ASEAN (Dec.  6, 2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/asem/pr061206_en.htm; Press Release, 
European Commission, Central America & Andean Community: Commission proposes 
negotiating directives for Association Agreements (Dec. 6, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ 
issues/bilateral/regions/central_america/pr061206_en.htm. 
 11. European Commission, Annex to Global Europe: Competing in the World. A 
Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, at 16, COM (2006) 567 final (Oct. 4, 2006). 
 12. Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative-Designate, Opening Statement to the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 11 (May 16, 2006) (transcript available at Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, Document Library, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/ 
Document_Library/USTR_Testimony/2006/asset_upload_file533_9447.pdf). 
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Oman, Peru and Colombia are pending, and agreements with 11 more 
countries are in negotiation.”13 
The parties to RTAs have generally emphasized that their 
meticulously constructed and ambitious bilateral agreements 
reinforce the WTO system rather than undermine it.14  Since 1947, 
GATT has stated explicitly that the “contracting parties recognize the 
desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, 
through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the 
economies of the countries parties to such agreements.”15  At the 
same time, the multilateral trade regime also imposes certain 
conditions on such RTAs.  Those conditions can be found in three 
different WTO sources: (1) In the area of trade in goods, RTAs are 
subject to GATT Article XXIV, complemented by an Understanding 
on its interpretation that was negotiated during the Uruguay Round;16 
(2) in the area of trade in services, the legal foundation for RTAs is 
found in Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS);17 and (3) RTAs concluded among developing countries 
benefit from particular rules contained in paragraph 2(c) of the 
Decision on Differential and more Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity 
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, also called the 
Enabling Clause.18 
As argued by John H. Jackson, the leading legal scholar in the 
field, the WTO must be regarded as the constitutional charter 
governing world trade.19  It is a constitution that “imposes different 
levels of constraint on the policy options available to public and 
private leaders.”20  In this context, the rules of GATT Article XXIV, 
GATS Article V and the Enabling Clause could be interpreted as 
setting the multilateral constitutional limits within which RTAs can 
 
 13. Id. at 12. 
 14. See, e.g., Mandelson, supra note 9, at 4, 6. 
 15. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:4. 
 16. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Result of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 
1161-63 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding on Article XXIV]. 
 17. GATS, supra note 1, art. V. 
 18. Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries ¶ 2(c) (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 
203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause]. 
 19. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 339 (1998). 
 20. Id. 
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maneuver.  Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea formulate this 
theoretical starting point as follows: “WTO principles and rules . . . 
assume the role of overriding, constitutional disciplines which 
structure the shape and contents of preferential agreements—all with 
a view to supporting trade creation, as building blocks to trade 
regulation and liberalization, while at the same time avoiding 
unnecessary trade distortions and diversions.”21  While the WTO’s 
constitutional structure “has potential value for creating greater 
predictability, redressing unfair power imbalances, and preventing 
escalating international tensions,” Jackson admits that there remain 
considerable reasons to be discontented with the “trade constitution” 
as it exists today.22  One of the areas of discontent is precisely the 
relationship between the WTO and the RTAs.23  The WTO provisions 
on RTAs have, indeed, proved to be ill-equipped to deal efficiently 
with the realities of RTAs.  The WTO Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA), which is entrusted with the task of verifying 
the WTO compliance of RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV 
and GATS Article V, has proved to be practically non-functional.24  
Only once has there been a consensus on WTO consistency of the 
RTAs that have been notified.25  This dismal performance casts a 
doubt on the WTO’s constitutional role in international trade 
relations.  The WTO’s practical inability to come to a consensus on 
the compatibility of RTAs with the multilateral rules is an indicator 
 
 21. Thomas Cottier & Marina Foltea, Constitutional Functions of the WTO and Regional 
Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 43, 44 
(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006). 
 22. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 340. 
 23. Id. at 344.  Among trade lawyers and economists, there seems to be a consensus that 
the WTO/GATT rules on RTAs have proved to be “a failure, if not a fiasco.”  KENNETH W. 
DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 275 (1970).  See 
also Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New 
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419 (2001); Petros C. Mavroidis, Do Not 
Ask Too Many Questions: the Institutional Arrangements for Accommodating Regional 
Integration within the WTO, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 239 (E. Kwan Choi & 
James C. Hartigan eds., 2005); Colin B. Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. the WTO: A 
Proposal for Reform of Article XXIV to Counter this Institutional Threat, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 267 (2005).  For a prominent voice among economists, see JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 76-79 (1991); Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and 
Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 44 (Jaime de 
Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993). 
 24. Negotiating Group on Rules, Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade 
Agreements, ¶¶ 13-21, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1 (Aug. 1, 2002). 
 25. See Press Release, WTO, Lamy Welcomes WTO Agreement on Regional Trade 
Agreements, supra note 1. 
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of a major credibility gap existing between the organization’s 
expectations expressed in constitutional theory and its actual 
capabilities in monitoring RTAs.26  This is particularly serious in light 
of the current proliferation of RTAs.27  As a remedy for the current 
lack of effectiveness in the WTO’s surveillance of RTAs, leading 
scholars such as Cottier and Foltea have proposed a reinforcement of 
the principle of primacy of WTO law by adopting “an explicit 
constitutional approach of regulating preferential agreements by and 
through the disciplines of WTO law.”28  By clearly establishing the 
supremacy of WTO law over RTAs, preferential agreements that are 
incompatible with WTO law would either be declared null and void 
ab initio or unlawful under international law, which would trigger 
state responsibility.29  While elegant from an international law 
perspective, such proposals suffer from “constitutional overstretch” 
and therefore threaten to further widen the credibility gap between 
the WTO’s real capabilities and the constitutional expectations.30 
In order to fix the WTO’s credibility gap with regard to the 
monitoring of RTAs, this article takes a pragmatic view that is based 
on three basic considerations.  First, the rich literature on compliance 
with international legal norms underlines that the substantive 
characteristics of treaty obligations are among the most important 
predicting factors affecting effective implementation.31  General and 
 
 26. The expressions “credibility gap” and “capability-expectations gap” have been 
successful tools in the analysis of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy.  In 
an influential article, Christopher Hill predicted that the announcement of a “common” 
European foreign policy by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) would exacerbate an emerging 
“capabilities-expectations gap” by raising expectations that the European Union was simply 
incapable of fulfilling.  The gap was seen as potentially dangerous because the exaggerated 
expectations in the European Union’s institutional possibilities were likely to produce 
disproportionate degree of disillusion and resentment with the European Union itself when 
hopes would inevitably be dashed.  Christopher Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or 
Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, 31 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 305 (1993); 
Christopher Hill, Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?, in A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY 
FOR EUROPE? 18 (John Peterson & Helene Sjursen eds., 1998). 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. Cottier & Foltea, supra note 21, at 67. 
 29. Id. at 68. 
 30. The concept of “overstretch” is frequently used in the analysis of foreign policy. 
Overstretch emerges when an actor’s commitments go beyond its actual grasp.  See WALTER 
LIPPMANN, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC 9 (1943); see generally Samuel P. 
Huntington, Coping with the Lippmann Gap, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 453 (1988). 
 31. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); MARKUS 
BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ENGAGING 
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
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imprecise duties that leave a large margin of interpretation are much 
less likely to be correctly implemented and complied with than 
precise obligations that are tested on their simplicity in 
implementation.32  Therefore, the first order of business for the WTO 
is to clarify and simplify the vague criteria that currently apply to 
RTAs.  As long as the substantive criteria remain deficient, it will 
hardly be possible to determine with a sufficient degree of legitimacy 
whether or not RTAs are WTO-compatible.  In this context, Part III 
of this article will assess the substantive WTO law governing RTAs 
with a view of suggesting pragmatic solutions to the major problem 
points. 
Second, such leading scholars in the field of compliance with 
international agreements as Abram and Antonia Chayes have 
emphasized that “the fundamental instrument for maintaining 
compliance with treaties” is not the threat of sanctioning, but “an 
iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organization, and the wider public.”33  In this process, the instruments 
of active compliance management include transparency, reporting, 
data collection, verification, monitoring, strategic review and 
assessment in addition to capacity-building and assistance for those 
who lack capacity.34  Within this context, it is important that the 
procedural aspects of the WTO’s monitoring process with regard to 
RTAs are further streamlined.  As Part IV of this article will make 
clear, the Doha Round Transparency Mechanism for RTAs 
constitutes a positive step in this direction but needs to be followed 
up with a proper system for the permanent review of RTAs 
throughout their lifetime. 
Third, it is only when the substantive rules have been sufficiently 
clarified and a permanent surveillance framework is established that 
the actual enforcement of the WTO’s disciplines in the field of RTAs 
stands a chance.  These two prerequisites to effective enforcement are 
not currently fulfilled with respect to RTAs.  In view of the vague 
wording of the WTO provisions on RTAs and the need to preserve 
 
ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998); THE IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004). 
 32. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with 
International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READING 179, 185 (Charlotte Ku & 
Paul F. Diehl eds., 1st ed. 1998). 
 33. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 31, at 25. 
 34. See id. at 197. 
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the institutional balance on which the WTO rests, the in-depth 
analysis of the justiciability of the WTO disciplines on RTAs, 
described in Part V, leads to the conclusion that a distinction must be 
made between the enforcement of concrete trade policy “measures” 
and judging the overall legality of RTAs.  Following the logic of the 
Panel in the Turkey-Textiles case, concrete trade policy measures 
should be subject of strict surveillance and sanctioning, notably via 
WTO dispute settlement.  However, in contrast with the reasoning of 
the WTO’s Appellate Body, it would be counterproductive for the 
credibility of the WTO and for the long-term effectiveness of the 
multilateral trade disciplines if the WTO dispute settlement organs 
were to get into questions of the overall legality of specific regional 
arrangements.35  Rather, the overall compatibility of regional 
arrangements with WTO rules should be the subject of improved 
transparency and diplomatic peer review on the basis of the 
strengthened benchmarks proposed in Part III. 
Before tackling the core issues described above, Part I will start 
with a factual state-of-play of trade regionalism today, and Part II will 
put the current WTO framework for RTAs in its historical and legal 
context. 
I.  REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW 
In the evolution of regionalism since the end of World War II, 
three phases can be distinguished. 
A. The European Era of Regionalism 
The first phase is the European era of regionalism.36  It started 
with the Treaty of Rome’s entry into force in 1958, which established 
the European Economic Community (EEC).37  As a customs union 
 
 35. Both cases will be analyzed throughout this article.  For the Reports, see Panel Report, 
Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) 
[hereinafter Panel Report on Turkey-Textiles] and Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions 
on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 58, WT/DS43/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles]. 
 36. While European developments were dominant during this period, it must be noted 
that, in 1965, New Zealand and Australia concluded their own bilateral Free Trade Agreement.  
The 1960s also saw the conclusion of numerous RTAs between developing countries.  However, 
most of these agreements were never fully implemented. 
 37. Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].  The EEC builds upon the experience of the European 
Coal and Steel Community.  Treaty of Paris Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].  The EEC Treaty has 
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with a common commercial policy, the EEC quickly became a leading 
player in international trade relations.38  The western and northern 
European countries that were not part of the EEC came together in 
the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).39  During the 1970s, 
the EEC expanded its influence through an impressive set of bilateral 
preferential trade areas with the neighboring EFTA countries, the 
Mediterranean countries, and the former colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP).40  Since then, the EEC has 
continued to be actively engaged in the negotiation of new 
preferential trade agreements.41 
 
been amended on several occasions.  The most important change took place through the Treaty 
of Maastricht on European Union, signed on February 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 
247 [hereinafter EU Treaty].  The EU Treaty changed the name of the EEC to European 
Community (EC).  The EC is one of the three pillars of the European Union. As of January 1, 
2007, the EU has twenty-seven member states and a population of 492.8 million inhabitants.  
The European Union is the world’s largest trading bloc with a combined GDP of 10,948 billion 
Euros.  See Press Release, European Commission, EU and Euro Area Enlargement on 1 
January 2007: The New EU of 27 and Euro Area of 13 (Dec. 19, 2006), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/06/167&format=HTML&aged
=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 38. The European Community’s common commercial policy is based on Article 133 of the 
EC Treaty.  Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) art. 
133 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
 39. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established by the Stockholm 
Convention signed on January 4, 1960.  The main objective of the Stockholm Convention was to 
provide a framework for the liberalization of trade in goods amongst its Member States.  See 
EFTA, EFTA Convention Texts, http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EFTAConvention/ 
EFTAConventionTexts/EFTAConventionText (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).  At this stage, 
EFTA has only four members left: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
 40. In addition to the Lomé Convention with the African, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
countries, Council Regulation 199/76, 1976 O.J. (L 25) 1, the EC’s framework of RTAs of the 
1970s included bilateral free trade agreements with Switzerland, Council Regulation 2840/72, 
1972, O.J. (L 300) 188, Iceland, Council Regulation 2842/72, 1972, O.J. (L 301) 1, Norway, 
Council Regulation 1691/73, 1973, O.J. (L 171) 1, Austria, Council Regulation 2836/72, 1972, 
O.J. (L 300) 1, Finland, Council Regulation 1508/74, 1974, O.J. (L 163) 1, Sweden, Council 
Regulation 2838/72, 1972, O.J. (L 300) 96, Spain, Council Regulation 1524/70, 1970, O.J. (L 182) 
1, Portugal, Council Regulation 2844/72, 1972, O.J. (L 301) 164, and preferential trade 
agreements with Morocco, Council Regulation 2211/78, 1978, O.J. (L 264) 1, Tunisia, Council 
Regulation 2212/78, 1978, OJ. (L 265) 1, Algeria, Council Regulation 2210/78, 1978, O.J. (L 263) 
1, Egypt, Council Regulation 2213/78, 1978, O.J. (L 266) 1, Jordan, Council Regulation 2215/78, 
1978, O.J. (L 268) 1, Lebanon, Council Regulation 2214/78, 1978, O.J. (L 267) 1, Syria, Council 
Regulation 2216/78, 1978, O.J. (L. 269) 1, and Israel, Council Regulation 1274/75, 1975, O.J. (L 
136) 1. 
 41. See European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ 
issues/bilateral/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
01__DEVUYST_SERDAREVIC.DOC 5/27/2008  1:26:36 PM 
10 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 18:1 
B. The American Era of Regionalism 
The second phase is the American era of regionalism.  While the 
United States had traditionally been wary of RTAs, its attitude 
changed in the late 1980s.42  The conclusion of the bilateral free trade 
deal between Canada and the United States in 1988 opened the door 
for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992.43  
The United States has also propagated such RTA initiatives as the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the development of 
free trade within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
framework.44  In addition, the United States has either concluded or is 
in the process of negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with such 
countries as Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru and Singapore.45 
At the same time, several other American RTAs came into being 
or were revitalized: the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1989, 
the Andean Community of Nations (ACN) in 1990, and the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) in 1993.46  More significantly, in 
 
 42. See generally FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 
1989); BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (William 
Diebold, Jr. ed., 1988); Charles Pearson & James Riedel, United States Trade Policy: From 
Multilateralism to Bilateralism?, in THE NEW PROTECTIONIST WAVE 100 (Enzo Grilli & Enrico 
Sassoon eds., 1990). 
 43. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993).  On NAFTA, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN 
ASSESSMENT (1993); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES (2005). 
 44. The FTAA and the APEC free trade area have not yet entered into force.  On the 
FTAA, see ANTONI ESTEVADEORDAL ET AL., INTEGRATING THE AMERICAS: FTAA AND 
BEYOND (2004); FREE TRADE OF THE AMERICAS? THE UNITED STATES’ PUSH FOR THE 
FTAA AGREEMENT (Paulo Vizentini & Marianne Wiesebron eds., 2004); P. J. Patterson et al., 
The Free Trade Area of the Americas and Smaller Economies, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 899 
(2004); Roberto Echandi, Regional Trade Integration in the Americas during the 1990s: 
Reflections of Some Trends and their Implication for the Multilateral Trade System, 4 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 367 (2001).  On APEC, see JOHN RAVENHILL, APEC AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
PACIFIC RIM REGIONALISM (2001); APEC IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Ryiana Miranti & Denis 
Hew eds., 2005); CHARLES E. MORRISON ET AL., AN APEC TRADE AGENDA? THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE ASIA PACIFIC (2005); C. Fred Bergsten, APEC 
after Osaka: Toward Free Trade by 2010/2020 (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 96-1, 
1996). 
 45. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Agreements, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 46. Wendy Grenade, An Overview of Regional Governance Arrangements within the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE AND LESSONS FOR THE AMERICAS 167 
(Joaquín Roy & Roberto Dominguez eds., 2005); Henry S. Gill, CARICOM: Origen, Objetivos 
y Perspectivos de Integración en el Caribe, 18 INTEGRACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA 37 (1993); 
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1991, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay created their own 
customs union, named MERCOSUR.47  In subsequent years, Bolivia, 
Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela have become 
associate partners of MERCOSUR. The Accession Protocol with 
Venezuela was signed in 2006.48 
C. The Global Era of Regionalism 
The third phase, characterizing the first decade of the 21st 
century, has been labeled the “noodle bowl,” referring to the 
multiplicity of Asian RTAs.49  More accurately, it should be labeled 
the global era of regionalism.  The third phase has three 
characteristics. 
1. The Boom in Asian RTAs.  Asia is a late-comer in the 
politics of regionalism.  In the early 1990s, the limited results of 
ASEAN led to the launching of more ambitious plans for an ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA).  AFTA became effective in 1994 and is 
aiming at reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers among ASEAN 
members on a large range of products.50  However, the real spark that 
 
Elsa Cardozo de Da Silva, La Comunidad Andina de Naciones: MERCOSUR y ALCA, in 
RETOS E INTERRELACIONES DE LA INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL: EUROPA Y AMÉRICA (Joaquín 
Roy et al. eds., 2003); Fernando Rueda-Junquera, Prospects for the Central American Customs 
Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION, supra, at 113; Eric 
Jacobstein, The Politics of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), in THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION, supra, at 135. 
 47. Treaty of Asunción, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041.  See generally MERCOSUR: 
BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY (Marcos Guedes & Francisco Dominguez eds., 
2004); NICOLA PHILLIPS, THE SOUTHERN CONE MODEL: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
REGIONAL CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (2004); John A. E. Vervaele, 
Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 387 (2005); G. 
Philippidis & A. I. Sanjuán, An Analysis of Mercosur’s Regional Trading Arrangements, 30 
WORLD ECON. 504 (2007). 
 48. INSTRUMENTOS FUNDACIONALES DEL MERCOSUR 5 (Secretaría del Mercosur, 2007), 
available at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/es/index.htm (last visited 
on Feb. 19, 2008). 
 49. Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian 
Regionalism 2 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 5561, 2006). 
 50. Ludo Cuyvers, Philippe De Lombaerde & Stijn Verherstraeten, From AFTA towards 
an ASEAN Economic Community . . . and Beyond 4 (Centre for ASEAN Studies, CAS 
Discussion Paper No 46, 2005), available at http://webh01.ua.ac.be/cas/PDF/CAS46.pdf (last 
visited on Feb. 19, 2008).  See also ROADMAP TO AN ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (Denis 
Hew Wei-Yen ed., 2005); AFTA IN THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (Mohammed 
Ariff et al. eds., 1996); Gautam Jaggi, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 95-4, 1995); Markus Hund, From 
‘Neighbourhood Watch Group’ to Community?: The Case of ASEAN Institutions and the 
Pooling of Sovereignty, 56 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 99 (2002). 
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set off the current surge of RTAs in Asia was China’s initiative in 
2000 for a free trade agreement with ASEAN.51  The ASEAN-China 
framework agreement laying out the free trade plan was concluded in 
2003, and it is scheduled to eliminate tariffs by 2010.52  The Chinese 
initiative resulted in an “East Asian domino effect.”53  In response to 
China’s project, India also signed a framework agreement with 
ASEAN in 2003.54  However, progress towards its implementation has 
been stalled.55  As Japan and South Korea did not want to stay 
behind, they decided to start their own talks for RTAs.56  In 2006, 
Japan managed to conclude free trade economic partnership 
agreements with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.57  Also in 
2006, discussions between South Korea and ASEAN resulted in a 
free trade agreement.  Furthermore, there are ongoing negotiations 
between Japan and ASEAN, Japan and the individual ASEAN 
countries, and Japan and South Korea.58 
At the same time, Singapore successfully negotiated RTAs with 
countries outside ASEAN: New Zealand (2000), Japan (2002), 
 
 51. Richard E. Baldwin, Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocks 
on the Path to Global Free Trade, 29 WORLD ECON. 1451, 1491 (2006).  See also Rosemary Foot, 
China’s Regional Activism: Leadership, Leverage, and Protection, 17 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE 
& SECURITY 141 (2005); Vincent Wang Wei-Cheng, The Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: 
Economic Statecraft of Peaceful Ascendancy, in CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: GLOBAL 
CHALLENGES AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES 17, 18 (Ho Khai Leon & Samuel C.Y. Ku eds., 
2005); Daojiong Zha, The Politics of China-ASEAN Economic Relations: Assessing the Move 
towards a Free Trade Area, in ASIAN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 232; Jing Men, 
The Construction of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Study of China’s Active Involvement, 
21 GLOBAL SOC’Y 249, 253 (2007). 
 52. Jiangyu Wang, China’s Regional Trade Agreements: The Law, Geopolitics, and Impact 
on the Multilateral Trading System, 8 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 124-25 (2004); M. Ulric 
Killion, Chinese Regionalism and the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord: the WTO and Legalized 
Trade Distortion, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 4 (2005).  See generally, ASEAN-CHINA 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (Saw Swee-Hock ed., 2006). 
 53. Baldwin, supra note 51, at 1491. 
 54. India-ASEAN Framework Agreement, Oct. 8, 2003, http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/ 
pdf/India-ASEAN_framework_agreement_2003_.pdf. 
 55. INDIA-ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF 
GLOBALIZATION 2 (Nagesh Kumar & Rahul Sen eds., 2006).  See generally Rahul Sen, ‘New 
Regionalism’ in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Emerging Regional and Bilateral Trading 
Agreements involving ASEAN, China and India, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 553 (2006). 
 56. Hadi Soesastro, Regional Integration in East Asia: Achievements and Future Prospects, 
1 ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 215, 225, 227 (2006); Razeen Sally, Free Trade Agreements and the 
Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia, 1 ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 306, 314-15 (2006). 
 57. For the text of these agreements, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ 
economy/fta/index.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2007). 
 58. Baldwin, supra note 51, at 1491. 
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Australia (2003), the United States (2003), and South Korea (2006).59  
The RTAs negotiated by Singapore, in turn, “energised and raised 
the urgency for the other ASEAN countries to become more 
proactive in open trading activities.”60  The response from other 
ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand “was to seek their 
own [R]TAs to match the record number of [R]TAs signed by 
Singapore.”61  The Asian RTA wave has been labeled an example of 
“competitive liberalisation.”62 
2. The Creation of Interregional RTAs.  The negotiation of 
interregional RTAs has received a particular push from the European 
Community.63  Negotiations for a free trade agreement between the 
EC and Mercosur are well underway.64  Similarly, the EC has opened 
negotiations for the conclusion of a free trade deal with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council.65  In the context of the reform of its trade 
relations with the ACP countries, the EC is currently negotiating 
Economic Partnership Agreements, including reciprocal free trade, 
with West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Southern African Development Community, the Caribbean, and the 
Pacific.66  In addition, the European Commission has set for itself the 
 
 59. Ramkishen S. Rajan, Rahul Sen & Reza Siregar, Singapore and the New Regionalism: 
Bilateral Trade Linkages with Japan and the US, 26 WORLD ECON. 1325, 1327 (2003).  For the 
text of these agreements, see WorldTradeLaw.net, Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements 
Notified to the WTO, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/ftadatabase/ftas.asp (last visited Sept. 
30, 2007). 
 60. S.M. Thangavelu & Mun-Heng Toh, Bilateral ‘WTO-Plus’ Free Trade Agreements: The 
WTO Trade Policy Review of Singapore 2004, 28 WORLD ECON. 1211, 1215 (2005). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1217; Hadi Soesastro, Dynamics of Competitive Liberalization in RTA 
Negotiations: East Asian Perspective (Apr. 22-23, 2003) (paper presented at the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council Trade Forum, Washington, D.C.), available at 
http://www.pecc.org/publications/papers/trade-papers/1_SII/7-soesastro.pdf. 
 63. See generally INTERREGIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Heiner Hänggi, 
Ralf Roloff & Jürgen Rüland eds., 2005); Michael Reiterer, Interregionalism as a New 
Diplomatic Tool: the EU and East Asia, 11 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 223 (2006). 
 64. See generally HELIO JAGUARIBE & ALVARO DE VASCONCELOS, THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, MERCOSUR, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003); MERCOSUR-UNIÓN EUROPEA 
(Roberto Ruiz Díaz Labrano ed., 2001). 
 65. Gerd Nonneman, EU-GCC Relations: Dynamics, Patterns and Perspectives, 41 INT’L 
SPECTATOR 59, 61 (2006). 
 66. Melaku Geboye Desta, EC-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and WTO 
Compatibility: An Experiment in North-South Interregional Agreements, 43 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1343, 1360 (2006); Axel Borrmann et al., EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: 
Impact, Options and Prerequisites, 40 INTERECONOMICS 169, 171 (2005). 
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goal to start discussions towards free trade agreements with the 
Andean Community, Central America and ASEAN.67 
3. Preferential Trade Arrangements Among Geographically 
Distant Partners.  As the interregional negotiations indicate, 
preferential arrangements are no longer confined to a particular 
geographical region.  Trade relations in the 21st century are 
characterized by a proliferation of RTAs concluded between 
countries that are geographically far apart.  In addition to its 
intraregional deals, the European Community has concluded bilateral 
free trade deals with geographically distant countries such as South 
Africa (1999), Mexico (2000) and Chile (2002) and has announced its 
intention to start negotiations with India.68  Likewise, Japan has 
successfully negotiated intercontinental free trade agreements with 
Mexico (2004) and Chile (2006).69  The United States has recently 
concluded free trade agreements with geographically distant 
countries such as Jordan (2001), Bahrain (2004), and Morocco (2006) 
and is pursuing negotiations with Malaysia, South Korea and 
Thailand.70 
II.  THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL  
CONTEXT OF THE WTO’S RTA PROVISIONS 
For a proper understanding of the relationship between the 
increasing number of RTAs and today’s multilateral trade regime, a 
brief historical introduction to the WTO’s provisions on RTAs is 
necessary.  GATT started functioning on January 1, 1948, on the basis 
of the Protocol of Provisional Application to the Havana Charter of 
1948 establishing the International Trade Organization (ITO).71  The 
Protocol was signed in Geneva on October 13, 1947, following the 
Geneva Round of reciprocal tariff negotiations.72  GATT included 
 
 67. See Press Release, European Commission, Central America & Andean Community: 
Commission proposes negotiating directives for Association Agreements (Dec. 6, 2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/central_america/pr061206_en.htm. 
 68. European Commission, supra note 41. 
 69. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, supra note 57. 
 70. At the same time, the United States also pursued free trade deals with countries in the 
Americas.  Agreements were signed with Chile (2002), Colombia (2006), Panama (2006), and 
Peru (2006).  See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade 
Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html (last visited 
Dec. 8, 2007). 
 71. Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note 1. 
 72. Id. 
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relatively few clauses, mainly relating to tariff obligations.  Their main 
function was to enable the swift implementation of tariff reductions 
while awaiting the coming into existence of the ITO.  However, 
because the ITO was never ratified, GATT gradually assumed the 
role of the major multilateral trade forum.73 
GATT contains two general concepts that are essential to 
understanding the discussion on regionalism in international trade: 
schedules of tariff concessions and unconditional most-favored-nation 
(MFN) treatment.  GATT Article II introduces the concept of a 
“schedule of concessions,” where each contracting party lists detailed 
item-by-item tariff concessions negotiated during GATT rounds of 
tariff negotiations.74  In accordance with Article II, GATT contracting 
parties undertake the commitment to levy no more than the tariffs 
listed in the schedule.  Article II has been called GATT’s “central 
obligation” since it ensures the solidity of the tariff-reducing 
agreements concluded during the negotiating round.75  Therefore, it 
also fosters the likelihood of the contracting parties making credible 
initial commitments. 
The WTO’s GATS contains a similar provision.76  Each WTO 
member is required to have a schedule of specific commitments which 
“identifies the services for which members guarantee market access 
and national treatment and any limitations that may be attached.”77  
Schedules must specify: (1) the terms, limitations and conditions on 
market access; (2) the conditions and qualifications on national 
treatment; (3) the undertakings relating to additional commitments 
and, where appropriate, the time-frame for implementation of such 
commitments; and (4) the date of entry into force of such 
commitments.78  GATS Article XVI stipulates that “each Member 
[must] accord services and service suppliers of any other Member 
 
 73. See DAM, supra note 23, at 11; JACKSON, supra note 19, at 41; see also JOHN H. 
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 51 (1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE]. 
 74. ANWARUL HODA, TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE GATT 
AND THE WTO: PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 111 (2001); JACKSON, supra note 19, at 142; 
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A 
COMMENTARY 53-54 (2005). 
 75. JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 384 (1995). 
 76. World Trade Organization, The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): 
Objectives, Coverage and Disciplines, Question 8, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/ 
gatsqa_e.htm  (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) [hereinafter GATS Objectives]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. GATS, supra note 1, art. XX:1. 
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treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, 
limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its [commitment 
s]chedule.”79 
GATT Article I contains the most-favored nation (MFN) 
obligation.  It holds that, with respect to customs duties and all other 
rules in connection with importation and exportation, “any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties.”80  The unconditional MFN-norm thus implies non-
discriminatory treatment in importation and exportation among 
GATT contracting parties.81  In principle, the contracting parties are 
forbidden to grant special trade preferences or privileges to only one 
or a few other contracting parties.  In GATS, a comparable principle 
can be found.  Members are held to extend immediately and 
unconditionally to services or service suppliers of all other members 
“treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and 
service suppliers of any other country.”82 
In spite of its unconditional MFN principle, from the start, 
GATT tolerated the formation of customs unions and free trade 
areas.83  Both concepts are defined in greater detail in Part III. In 
short, customs unions aim to liberalize trade barriers between its 
members and create a common customs tariff and trade policy in 
relation with non-member countries.  Free trade areas share the 
internal component with customs unions, but do not create a unified 
external trade and customs policy towards third countries.84  As such, 
both customs unions and free trade areas constitute exceptions to the 
MFN principle.  Viewed in the context of the general elimination of 
 
 79. Id. art. XVI:1. 
 80. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. I:1. 
 81. For clear explanations of the GATT MFN principle, see JACKSON, supra note 19, at 
157; JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 75, at 444-56; PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW 
AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 310 (2005); MAVROIDIS, supra note 74, 
at 112; MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 205 (2006). 
 82. GATS, supra note 1, art. II:1.  In contrast with GATT 1994, GATS allows for 
derogations to the MFN-principle in the form of so-called Article II-exemptions.  Members 
were allowed to request such exemptions before GATS entered into force or at their time of 
accession.  Exemptions should not in principle last longer than 10 years.  GATS Objectives, 
supra note 76, Question 7; VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 81, at 325. 
 83. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV. 
 84. Id. art. XXIV:4. 
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trade preferences which the United States was seeking to forward in 
its Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment (1945) 
and the Suggested Charter for International Trade Organization 
(1946), the exception for customs unions and free trade areas 
deserves an explanation.85  Initially, the United States was aiming for 
a provision that authorized customs unions, but not free trade areas.86  
The customs union exception had been generally accepted during the 
inter-war period.  As the League of Nations’ Economic Committee 
stated in 1929: “Customs Unions constitute exceptions, recognized by 
tradition, to the principle of most-favored-nation treatment.”87  
During the negotiation of the GATT, the United States did not 
question this reasoning.  According to Clair Wilcox, then-Director of 
the Department of State’s Office of International Trade Policy, 
America’s acceptance of customs unions and refusal of other 
preferential arrangements had an economic reason: 
A customs union creates a wider trading area, removes obstacles to 
competition, makes possible a more economic allocation of 
resources, and thus operates to increase production and raise 
planes of living.  A preferential system, on the other hand, retains 
internal barriers, obstructs economy in production, and restrains 
the growth of income and demand.  It is set up for the purpose of 
conferring a privilege on producers within the system and imposing 
a handicap on external competitors.88 
In summary, Wilcox said, “[a] customs union is conducive to the 
expansion of trade on a basis of multilateralism and non-
discrimination; a preferential system is not.”89  After former Secretary 
of State George Marshall’s famous “Marshall Plan” speech on June 5, 
 
 85. JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO: ARTICLE 
XXIV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT 33-34 (2002); Kerry A. Chase, 
Multilateralism Compromised: the Mysterious Origins of GATT Article XXIV, 5 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 1, 6-7 (2006); Richard H. Snape, History and Economics of GATT’s Article XXIV, in 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 273, 281 (Kym Anderson & 
Richard Blackhurst eds., 1993); JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 73, at 576-77; GATT 
Secretariat, Note on Article XXIV of the General Agreement, MTN.GNG/NG7/W/13 (Aug. 11, 
1987). 
 86. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 73, at 576-77. 
 87. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, CUSTOMS UNIONS: A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF CUSTOMS UNION PROBLEMS at 31, U.N. Sales No. 
1948.II.D.3 (1947).  Although the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, it 
had accepted the customs union exception during the inter-war period.  See The Policy of the 
United States with Respect to Customs Unions and Regional Preferential Trade Arrangements 
(U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, Trade Barriers 
Subcommittee, 1943).  On the interwar preference practice, see MATHIS, supra note 85, at 13-20. 
 88. CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 70-71 (1949). 
 89. Id. at 71. 
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1947,90 the unification of Western Europe became one of 
Washington’s central foreign policy goals.91  As a result, banning 
customs unions became inconceivable since they were regarded as an 
adequate means to obtain European integration.92 
At the start of the negotiations that led to the GATT, it was not 
foreseen that Article XXIV would also authorize free trade areas, i.e. 
RTAs aiming to abolish trade barriers between its members, but 
without establishing a common tariff and common commercial 
policy.93  The free trade area provisions are the result of secret 
negotiations between the United States and Canada for the 
establishment of a bilateral trade agreement.94  The treaty initially 
envisaged by the American and Canadian negotiators was, however, 
limited to the removal of restrictions on their bilateral trade,95 which 
would not meet the customs union test.  As a result, the American 
delegation was instructed to find wording in the GATT that would 
accommodate the bilateral treaty with Canada.96  At the same time, 
the developing countries from Latin America and the Middle East 
had expressed dissatisfaction with the heavy conditions imposed on 
customs unions.97  While their request for permission to form 
preferential trading zones was rejected, free trade areas were added 
as a compromise formula.98  On the one hand, free trade areas were 
“easier” to achieve than customs unions as they did not require the 
creation of a unified external commercial and tariff policy among 
their members.  On the other hand, free trade areas still obliged the 
liberalization of substantially all trade between the constituent 
 
 90. George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, Remarks at Harvard University (June 5, 1947), 
reprinted in 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1947, at 237 (1972). 
 91. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN. AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1947-1952, at 26 (1987); GEIR LUNDESTAD, 
“EMPIRE” BY INTEGRATION. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1945-1947, 
at 29 (1997); ALAN S. MILWARD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE 1945-51, at 61 
(1984). 
 92. HOGAN, supra note 91, at 57-60; MILWARD, supra note 91, at 58-61, 232. 
 93. See Chase, supra note 85, at 1-6. 
 94. Id. at 12-14. 
 95. Id. at 13.  The free trade treaty between Canada and the United States that was 
envisaged in 1947 never entered into force.  Id. at 19. 
 96. See id. at 14. 
 97. See MATHIS, supra note 85, at 37-40; F. A. Haight, Customs Unions and Free-Trade 
Areas under GATT: A Reappraisal, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 391, 394-97 (1972). 
 98. GERARD CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES 
AND TECHNIQUES 261 (1965). 
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parties, thus avoiding the trade-diverting effects of preferential 
agreements limited to a few economic sectors. 
In 1956, during the negotiations for the creation of the European 
Economic Community, the United States maintained its support for 
the creation of customs unions and free trade areas.  In his 
instructions to diplomatic missions abroad, the then-Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, stated American policy in the following 
terms: 
The United States has generally opposed preferential arrangements 
in international trade because of the discrimination against the 
trade of third countries which they involve. The United States has 
taken a different and generally favorable attitude, however, toward 
customs unions and free-trade areas, since both involve, in addition 
to discrimination against the trade of third countries, the 
elimination of restrictions on substantially all of the trade among 
the participating countries, thereby making possible the more 
efficient allocation of economic resources among the participating 
countries with a consequent over-all expansion of international 
trade.99 
In subsequent years, the GATT/WTO rules authorizing RTAs were 
extended by the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds.  In November 1979, as 
part of the Tokyo Round, the GATT contracting parties adopted the 
Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity 
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, known as the 
“Enabling Clause.”100  It allows developing countries to grant trade 
preferences to each other without having to extend them to other 
WTO members.101  Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
GATS Article V authorizes the WTO members to be a party to an 
economic integration agreement liberalizing trade in services between 
or among the parties.  The Uruguay Round negotiators also 
succeeded in agreeing on an understanding (the “Uruguay Round 
Understanding” or the “Understanding”) on the interpretation of 
GATT Article XXIV.102 
 
 99. See Circular Airgram from the Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions (July 
13, 1956), reprinted in 4 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1955-1957, at 450 (1986). 
 100. Enabling Clause, supra note 18. 
 101. See id. ¶ 2(b). 
 102. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 16. 
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III.  THE WTO’S SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS  
FOR RTAS:  ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
While the new Transparency Mechanism is an essential 
component for the restoration of the WTO’s supervisory role on the 
trade policies pursued by RTAs, the impact of the Mechanism is 
necessarily limited by a number of non-procedural factors.103  One of 
the current stumbling blocks to the WTO’s effectiveness in dealing 
with RTAs is the lack of agreement on the interpretation of the 
substantive WTO criteria.104  Under GATT 1947, the Working Groups 
in charge of the examination of RTAs were generally unable to 
resolve basic methodological issues.105  As a consequence, the reports 
submitted by the Working Groups to the GATT Council did, in most 
cases, merely list the divergent views expressed by the contracting 
parties.106  In fact, the WTO Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA) has not been more productive than the old 
GATT Working Parties.107  The paragraphs below provide an 
explanation for the problems in the interpretation and application of 
the main substantive requirements for RTAs. 
The substantive rules relating to RTAs for goods are contained 
in paragraphs 4 through 10 of GATT Article XXIV, as clarified in the 
Uruguay Round.108  This Article includes both internal and external 
requirements applicable to the creation of free trade areas and 
customs unions.109 Internal requirements deal with the legal 
relationship among the constituent parties to customs unions and free 
trade areas.110  The external requirements concern the relationship 
between an RTA and the “outsiders.”111  Much like GATT Article 
XXIV, GATS Article V puts internal and external conditions on such 
RTAs that cover trade in services.112  As its terminology is close to 
that of GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V suffers from many of 
 
 103. See infra Part IV. 
 104. See infra Part III. 
 105. See 2 GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 759-62 (1994) 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO GATT]. 
 106. See id. at 761. 
 107. See supra notes 24-25. 
 108. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV; Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 16. 
 109. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV. 
 110. See infra Part III.A. 
 111. See infra Part III.B. 
 112. GATS, supra note 1, art. V. 
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the same problems that plague RTAs covering trade in goods.113  
Practice with GATS Article V is, however, significantly less 
developed than with GATT Article XXIV, which has existed since 
1947.114 
A. The WTO’s Internal Requirements for RTAs 
1. The Membership of RTAs.  The internal requirements are 
found in paragraphs 5, 8 and 5(c) of Article XXIV.  The first internal 
requirement concerns the membership of the RTAs.  Paragraph 5 
states that the provisions of the Agreement “shall not prevent, as 
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim 
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or a free-
trade area[.]”115  It has been debated whether paragraph 5 is also 
applicable to agreements with countries that are not contracting 
parties to GATT.116  As early as 1960, the reports of the Working 
Parties on the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and on the 
Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) recorded divergent views 
as to whether paragraph 5 is applicable to agreements with countries 
that are not contracting parties.117  The orthodox view is that a 
customs union or free trade with a country that is not a contracting 
party would need to be approved by a two-thirds majority in 
accordance with GATT Article XXIV:10.118  This position was 
defended by the United States in the framework of the GATT 
dispute settlement procedure on “EC-Tariff Treatment on Imports of 
Citrus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean 
Region.”119  The United States contended 
that the procedures of Article XXIV:7(b) applied only to interim 
agreements among contracting parties and hence not to the 
agreements concluded with [countries] which were not contracting 
parties [to the GATT].  These agreements were rather subject to 
 
 113. Compare GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 105, at 790-94, with GATS, supra note 1, art V. 
 114. Id. 
 115. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:5 (emphasis added). 
 116. Won-Mog Choi, Legal Problems of Making Regional Trade Agreements with Non-
WTO-Member States, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 825, 826 (2005). 
 117. GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 105, at 798. 
 118. See id. at 798-99. 
 119. Report of the Panel, EC-Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain 
Countries in the Mediterranean Region, L/5776 (Feb. 7, 1985) (unadopted). 
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the procedures of Article XXIV:10 which required a two-thirds 
majority approval.120 
The opposite argument was advanced by the European 
Community during the examination of its Association Agreements 
with Tunisia and Morocco.121  As Tunisia and Morocco were, at that 
time, not yet contracting parties, some delegations referred to the 
need for a waiver according to Article XXIV:10.122  The EC, however, 
recalled that in previous cases of EFTA and LAFTA, some 
participants in those free trade areas were not at the time contracting 
parties to the GATT 1947 either.123  On that basis, the EC claimed 
that it had been shown in practice that the term “territories of 
Contracting Parties” was not to be interpreted as restricting the 
applicability of paragraph 5.124 
The issue has never been formally settled.  At this stage, the 
CRTA has several RTAs under examination that have been 
concluded between a WTO member and a non-member. Armenia, 
Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic each notified RTAs with non-
members, such as the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.125  
The EC concluded Euro-Mediterranean free trade agreements with 
non-members Algeria, Lebanon and Syria.126  In practice, the political 
and economic imperatives that drive RTAs have been stronger than 
the controversial WTO membership prerequisite.127  As the number of 
WTO members continues to grow, the long-run issue is likely to 
become less problematic.128 
 
 120. Id. ¶ 3.14. 
 121. EEC-Agreements of Association with Tunisia and Morocco, ¶ 16, L/3379 (Apr. 7, 1970), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 149, 154 (1970). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. With one exception, these agreements were concluded before Armenia, Georgia and 
the Kyrgyz Republic became WTO members.  Armenia notified RTAs with non-members the 
Russian Federation (1993), Ukraine (1996), Turkmenistan (1996) and Kazakhstan (2001).  
Georgia notified RTAs with the Russian Federation (1994), Ukraine (1996), Azerbaijan (1996), 
Kazakhstan (1999) and Turkmenistan (2000).  The Kyrgyz Republic notified RTAs with the 
Russian Federation (1993), Kazakhstan (1995), Ukraine (1998) and Uzbekistan (1998).  WTO, 
Regional Trade Agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 126. European Commission, supra note 41. 
 127. See infra Part V. 
 128. GATT 1947 originally had twenty-three contracting parties.  WTO, The GATT Years: 
From Havana to Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2007).  The WTO currently has 149 members.  WTO, Understanding the 
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Proposal: From a constitutional perspective, the continuing 
confusion on the interpretation of the WTO membership requirement 
is a factor that feeds the WTO’s credibility gap.  In this context, an 
authoritative interpretation of GATT Article XXIV:5 is required.  
This interpretation should consist of two elements.  First, as a matter 
of principle, the interpretation should confirm that GATT intended 
RTAs to be concluded between its contracting parties.  Second, it 
should recognize that the CRTA has several RTAs under 
consideration that involve non-WTO members.  Where WTO 
members find it necessary to conclude RTAs with non-members, two 
additional requirements should be imposed.  The WTO members of 
such RTAs should (a) be required to provide the CRTA with a full 
explanation on the reasons for concluding the RTA with the non-
member; and (b) be required to take the responsibility of providing 
technical assistance to the non-member with a view of bringing that 
country towards WTO membership.  As such, RTAs between WTO 
members and non-members would effectively become learning tools 
for the non-members.129 
2. The Degree of Trade Liberalization: the “Substantially All” 
Requirement.  The second internal requirement focuses on trade 
coverage.  GATT Article XXIV:8(a)(i) provides that customs union 
shall be understood to mean “the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories,” so that duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated with respect to 
“substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the 
union.”130  The precise definition of “substantially all” has troubled 
the assessment of RTAs from the start.  The matter is of particular 
relevance for the RTAs that fail to fully liberalize trade in all 
economic sectors, such as agriculture. 
The “substantially all the trade” requirement was initiated by the 
United States because of its bilateral trade discussions with Canada, 
which coincided with the negotiations that created the GATT in 
 
WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
 129. For example, when the EC and EFTA each concluded bilateral free trade agreements 
with Bulgaria in 1993, the latter was not yet a GATT contracting party.  Bulgaria’s Europe 
Association Agreement with the EC paved the way for integration into the EC’s common 
commercial policy and thereby led to WTO membership.  Bulgaria became a WTO member in 
1996.  On Bulgaria and the WTO, see WTO, Bulgaria and the WTO, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/countries_e/bulgaria_e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). 
 130. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:8(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
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1947.131  The American negotiators in the multilateral framework 
were therefore instructed to insist on language that did not require 
total free trade between the parties to a RTA.132  While aiming for a 
bilateral RTA with Canada, the United States was not planning to 
give up its agricultural quotas for wheat and wheat flour and its 
seasonal quotas on many fruits and vegetables.133  Antidumping and 
countervailing duties against Canadian products were also to remain 
in force.134  In this context, the American negotiators invented the 
“substantially all” concept.135 
During the examination of the European Economic Community 
in 1957, its member states proposed that “a free-trade area should be 
considered as having been achieved for substantially all the trade 
when the volume of liberalized trade reached 80 per cent [sic] of total 
trade.”136  Many other members of the Working Party examining the 
EEC refused this proposal, as they held that it was “inappropriate to 
fix a general figure of the percentage of trade” as a requirement to 
meet the “substantially all” criterion.137 
An attempt at clarifying the matter during the Working Party on 
EFTA in 1960 was far from conclusive.  The Working Party report 
simply noted the view by several delegations that “the phrase 
‘substantially all the trade’ had a qualitative as well as quantitative 
aspect and that it should not be taken as allowing the exclusion of a 
major sector of economic activity.  For this reason, the percentage of 
trade covered, even if it were established to be 90 per cent [sic], was 
not considered to be the only factor to be taken into account.”138  This 
issue was later touched upon in the preamble of the Uruguay Round 
Understanding.  While it did not formulate a key to the legal 
interpretation of the “substantially all” criterion, the Understanding 
“recogniz[ed]” in general political terms that the positive trade 
contribution of RTAs “is increased if the elimination between 
constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of 
 
 131. Chase, supra note 85, at 13-15. 
 132. Id. at 14-15. 
 133. Id. at 17. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. GATT, Report Submitted by the Committee on Treaty of Rome to the Contracting 
Parties on 29 November 1957, Annex IV ¶ 30, L/778 (Nov. 29, 1957). 
 137. Id. Annex IV ¶ 34. 
 138. GATT, Report of the Working Party on the European Free Trade Association, ¶ 48, 
L/1235 (June 4, 1960). 
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commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector of 
trade is excluded[.]”139 
The state of agreement on the interpretation of this crucial 
paragraph has hardly progressed with the entry into force of the 
WTO.140  In the Turkey-Textiles case of 1999, the WTO dispute 
settlement Panel and the Appellate Body did not proceed much 
beyond the Working Party’s assessment.141  The Panel acknowledged 
that neither the GATT contracting parties nor the WTO members 
have ever reached agreement on the interpretation of the provision’s 
“substantially all” term.142  In an attempt to nevertheless clarify the 
matter, the Panel held that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the term 
‘substantially’ in the context of sub-paragraph 8(a) appears to provide 
for both qualitative and quantitative components.”143  The Appellate 
Body confirmed this finding,144 and further agreed with the Panel that 
the “terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) offer ‘some flexibility’ to the 
constituent members of a customs union when liberalizing their 
internal trade.”145 
It is clear that an effective WTO monitoring process of RTAs 
requires a consensus on the interpretation of the term “substantially 
all,” and discussion has continued in the framework of the Doha 
 
 139. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 16, pmbl. 
 140. See WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE, GATT 
1994, Part III, Article XXIV, ¶ 631 (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ 
analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm#article24 [hereinafter WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX]. 
 141. See generally Panel Report on Turkey – Textiles, supra note 35; Appellate Body Report 
on Turkey – Textiles, supra note 35.  For a comment on these reports, see James H. Mathis, 
WTO, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, 27 LEGAL ISSUES OF 
ECON. INTEGRATION 103 (2000); Joel P. Trachtman, Decisions of the Appellate Body of the 
World Trade Organization, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 217 (2000); Gabrielle Marceau & Cornelis 
Reiman, When and How Is a Regional Trade Agreement Compatible with the WTO?, 28 LEGAL 
ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 297 (2001); Peter Hilpold, Regional Integration According to 
Article XXIV GATT – Between Law and Politics, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 219 (2003). 
 142. Panel Report on Turkey – Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 9.148. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Appellate Body Report on Turkey – Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 49.  According to Thomas 
Cottier and Mathias Oesch, the current state of the law can be summarized as follows: for an 
RTA to be consistent with Article XXIV, “the term ‘substantially all the trade’ requires 
cumulatively that a certain percentage of trade is liberalized and no major sector of a national 
economy is excluded.”  See THOMAS COTTIER & MATHIAS OESCH, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY IN THE WTO, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SWITZERLAND 
378 (2005); Thomas Cottier, The Legal Framework for Free Trade Areas & Customs Unions in 
WTO Law, in MULTILATERALISM AND BILATERALISM AFTER CANCUN: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES OF REGIONALISM 107, 109 (Martin Godel & Jonathan Gage eds., 2004). 
 145. Appellate Body Report on Turkey – Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 48. 
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Round.146  A number of delegations have limited themselves to 
repeating the well-known position that “substantially all” cannot be 
simplified into a mere mathematical formula, as it also contains 
qualitative aspects.147  Among those looking for a solution, some 
participants expressed that they were in favor of a definition based on 
trade benchmarks.148  Others have argued for “a definition setting 
minimum percentages for both duty-free tariff lines and trade flows, 
referring in that context to the need for an adequate approach for 
evaluating the exclusion of major sectors from the RTA coverage.”149 
The most elaborate proposal on the interpretation of the 
“substantially all” criterion was formulated by Australia in 2005.150  
The Australian submission recognizes that statistics on actual trade 
flows between RTA partners cannot take into account the dynamics 
of the economic integration process, and starts from the premise that 
such figures are of limited use in the “substantially all” debate.151  
Instead, Australia proposes to define the “substantially all” criterion 
in terms of the tariff lines listed in the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System (HS).152  According to the Australian 
proposal, RTAs would—upon their entry into force—need to 
eliminate duties and other restrictions to trade on at least seventy 
percent of tariff lines at the HS six-digit level.153  Within a ten-year 
transition period, this figure would need to increase to ninety-five 
percent and the exclusion of “highly traded products” would be 
 
 146. See Negotiating Group on Rules, Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 8 & 10 July 
2002, ¶ 19, TN/RL/M/3 (Aug. 1, 2002). 
 147. Negotiating Group on Rules, Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 11 June 2003, ¶ 
20, TN/RL/M/9 (July 10, 2003). 
 148. Negotiating Group on Rules, Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 17-18 May 2005, 
¶ 4, TN/RL/M/27 (June 30, 2005). 
 149. Id. ¶ 9. 
 150. See generally Negotiating Group on Rules, Submission on Regional Trade Agreements 
by Australia, TN/RL/W/173/Rev1 (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Submission by Australia (March)] 
(outlining Australia’s proposal); Negotiating Group on Rules, Submission on Regional Trade 
Agreements by Australia, TN/RL/W/180 (May 13, 2005) [hereinafter Submission by Australia 
(May)] (responding to comments on its previous submission); Edwini Kessie, Counsellor, 
Presentation of the Council and Trade Negotiation Committee, Negotiations on Regional Trade 
Agreements 21-31 (June 12-13, 2006) (presentation available at the U.N. Institute for Training 
and Research, http://www.unitarny.org/mm/File/RTA%20negotiations.pdf). 
 151. Kessie, supra note 150, at 21. 
 152. Submission by Australia (May), supra note 150, ¶ 13.  For more on the Harmonized 
System, see HODA, supra note 74, at 124; MAVROIDIS, supra note 74, at 56. 
 153. Submission by Australia (March), supra note 150, ¶ 13. 
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prohibited.154  While it has the advantage of being easily verifiable and 
avoiding complicated economic analysis, the Australian proposal does 
not yet hold a consensus.155  Japan, in particular, has argued that a 
tariff line-based test alone is deficient as it does not reflect the actual 
trade volume.156 
Much like GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V also stipulates 
that RTAs covering trade in services must have “substantial sectoral 
coverage.”157  In addition, RTAs should provide for the absence or 
elimination of “substantially all” discrimination between and among 
the parties in the sectors covered.158  This can be achieved through 
elimination of discriminatory measures and/or prohibition of new or 
more discriminatory measures, “at the entry into force of that 
agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except for 
measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis.”159  
Substantial sectoral coverage is defined as a condition “understood in 
terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of 
supply.  In order to meet this condition, [the] agreement[] should not 
provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply.”160  This 
means that RTAs for trade in services should, in principle, be 
applicable to: 
(1) cross-frontier supplies not involving any movement of persons; 
(2) consumption abroad, which entails the movement of the 
consumer into the territory of the WTO member country in which 
the supplier is established; (3) commercial presence, i.e. the 
presence of a subsidiary or branch in the territory of the WTO 
member country in which the service is to be rendered; and (4) the 
presence of natural persons from a WTO member country, 
enabling a supplier from one member country to supply services 
within the territory of any other member country.161 
 
 154. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.  Such “highly traded products” would be defined either as those products for 
which the value of a member’s imports in any single HS six-digit line as a proportion of their 
total imports from the RTA partner exceeds 0.2% or the top fifty imports of each RTA party at 
HS six-digit level.  Submission by Australia (May), supra note 150, ¶ 14. 
 155. Kessie, supra note 150, at 23.  See generally id. at 32-104 (outlining other members’ 
proposals). 
 156. See Submission on Regional Trade Agreements, Sec. III ¶¶ 1-3, TN/RL/W/190 (Oct. 28, 
2005) (Japan’s submission); Discussion Paper on Regional Trading Arrangements, ¶ 6, 
TN/RL/W/114 (June 6, 2003) (India’s Discussion Paper). 
 157. GATS, supra note 1, art. V:1(a). 
 158. Id. art. V:1(b). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. art. V:1(a) n.1. 
 161. Case 1/94, Opinion pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, ¶ 43, 1994 E.C.R. I-
5267. 
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In order to evaluate whether the conditions have been met, 
consideration must “be given to the relationship of the agreement to 
a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization among 
the countries concerned.”162  In spite of the guidance provided by 
GATS Article V, the concrete interpretation of the required sectoral 
coverage is a matter of discussion.  One view is that RTAs should not 
necessarily cover all sectors.163  Another view is that the flexibility 
provided by the word “substantial” does not allow for the exclusion 
of a sector from an RTA.164  The precise extent of liberalization 
needed for an RTA to meet the “substantial sectoral coverage” test 
thus remains to be resolved.165 
Proposal: The long-lasting inability of GATT/WTO to agree on a 
definition of the “substantially all trade” criterion is a major 
contributor to the WTO’s constitutional credibility gap with respect 
to RTAs.  If the WTO is to play a meaningful role with respect to the 
assessment of RTAs, it should find a solution to the deadlock.  First, 
it is necessary to reaffirm the reasons for the “substantially all” 
requirement, which is to avoid preferential agreements that provide 
for the liberalization of only a few products. 166  The idea behind this is 
to discourage predominantly trade-diverting arrangements and to 
avoid a repetition of the devastating disintegration of the world 
economy that characterized the 1930s.  Second, as it seems useful to 
maintain the “substantially all” criterion, a workable definition needs 
to be agreed upon.  Definitions based on trade flows are problematic.  
As Sungjoon Cho has underlined, “the measurement of ‘liberalized’ 
trade volume would hardly be accurate in reality because such 
measurement is generally based on ex ante forecasts of unrealized 
transactions . . . .”167  WTO practice has, indeed, shown that it is 
hardly possible to accurately measure the impact of RTAs on actual 
 
 162. GATS, supra note 1, art. V:2. 
 163. See Negotiating Group on Rules, supra note 24, ¶¶ 67-68. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See generally Hilpold, supra note 141, at 231 (explaining that partially integrated RTAs 
can be trade-diverting agreements).  In this context, Hilpold quotes Robert E. Hudec: “once 
governments are allowed to select some products and not others, political forces will inevitably 
exert enormous pressure to choose trade-diverting preferences first.  Trade-diverting 
preferences are the ones that result in the greatest net political gain for governments; the 
political gains arise from pleasing local producers who displace third-country producers, while 
political losses are entirely avoided because third-country producers do not vote.”  Robert E. 
Hudec, GATT’s Influence on Regional Arrangements, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 151, 155 (Jaime Melo & Arvind Panagariua eds., 1993). 
 167. Cho, supra note 23, at 443. 
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trade flows that are dynamic and shift over time.168  Definitions based 
on the non-exclusion of economic sectors are equally problematic.  
On the one hand, members disagree on the definition of “economic 
sector.”169  On the other hand, considering the many RTAs that fail to 
fully liberalize trade in agriculture, it is unrealistic to expect a 
consensus on an all-sector-inclusive-obligation for RTAs. 
In light of these two problems, the Australian proposal of 2005 
offers the most constructive solution.  The “substantially all” 
discussion should be based on the tariff lines in the schedules of 
concession at the HS six-digit level, which is internationally 
recognized and can hardly pose problems.  RTAs that do not reach 
the required liberalization percentages of seventy percent at the start 
and ninety-five percent after a ten-year transition period should be 
obliged to present a plan that details the manner in which barriers to 
trade would be eliminated as regards additional tariff lines in the 
schedules of concession.  While the recommended plan might lack 
sophistication, it would avoid unnecessary methodological discussions 
on measuring trade volumes or defining economic sectors.170 
3. The Reciprocity of Trade Liberalization.  The third criterion 
concerns the reciprocity of liberalization between the parties in free 
trade areas and customs unions.  Under GATT 1947, several one-way 
free trade areas had been notified.171  Whether the Article XXIV:8 
requirement to liberalize “substantially all the trade” implied that 
such liberalization needed to be fully reciprocal was the subject of 
debate and disagreement.172  As pointed out by Australia during the 
examination of its Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement with 
Papua New Guinea, “Article XXIV did not contain any specific 
provision with respect to reverse preferences.”173  As a result, 
Australia claimed that the non-reciprocity of the agreement did not 
 
 168. See infra notes 222-28. 
 169. See sources cited supra notes 136-38. 
 170. As it is argued by Jeffrey J. Schott, such definitional problems clouded many of the 
earlier proposals to set a numerical target for the “substantially all” criterion. See Jeffrey J. 
Schott, Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System?, in FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 3, 18 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004). 
 171. See GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 105, at 826. 
 172. See id. at 826-27. 
 173. Id. (quoting Report of the Working Party on the Australia/Papua New Guinea Trade 
and Commercial Relations Agreement, ¶ 7, L/4571 (Nov. 11, 1977)). 
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affect the free-trade area status.174  Other contracting parties 
disagreed.  They 
expressed doubts about the conformity of the Agreement with the 
provisions of Article XXIV, since it appeared that no reciprocal 
reduction of duties or elimination of other restrictive regulations of 
commerce by Papua New Guinea had been required. . . . One 
member . . . stated that he did not share the view expressed by the 
representative of Australia that, in light of the fact that Article 
XXIV made no mention of reverse preferences, reciprocity was not 
required between the parties to free-trade area agreements.175 
Similar disagreements emerged following the notification by the 
European Community of its Lomé Conventions with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.176  None of these Conventions 
obliged the associated countries to grant reverse preferences.177 
The reciprocity issue increased in significance during the long-
lasting dispute on the EC’s trade regime for bananas under the Lomé 
Convention.  The EC maintained that the requirement of Article 
XXIV:8(b), according to which free trade areas must cover 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories. did not 
apply in respect of arrangements between developed contracting 
parties and developing countries.178  Because of the principle of non-
reciprocity set out in GATT Part IV, the EC claimed that its one-way 
free trade regime for the ACP countries was fully compatible with the 
GATT.179  The GATT dispute settlement panels disagreed, holding 
that GATT Part IV did not permit contracting parties to accord 
preferences to a selected group of developing countries and that 
doing so was inconsistent with the MFN-principle of GATT Article 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 827. 
 176. See Report of the Working Party on the ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, ¶¶ 10-14, 
L/4369 (July 15, 1976), GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 46 (1977); Report of the Working Party 
on the Second ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, ¶ 17, L/5292 (Mar. 31, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(29th Supp.) at 119 (1983); Report of the Working Party on the Third ACP-EEC Convention of 
Lomé, ¶¶ 12, 19, L/6382 (Sept. 22, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 321 (1989). For the 
history of the Lomé Conventions, see European Commission, From Lomé I to IV bis,  
http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/Cotonou/LomeGen/LomeItoIV_en.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2008). 
 177. See Jürgen Huber, The Past, Present and Future ACP-EC Trade Regime and the WTO, 
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 427, 428-30 (2000); GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 105, at 826-27. 
 178. Report of the Panel, EEC – Member States’ Import Regimes for Bananas, ¶ 364, 
DS32/R (June 3, 1993) (not adopted) [hereinafter Panel Report Bananas I]; see Report of the 
Panel, EEC – Import Regimes for Bananas, ¶¶ 159-61, DS38/R (Feb. 11, 1994) (not adopted) 
[hereinafter Panel Report Bananas II]. 
 179. Panel Report Bananas II, supra note 178, ¶ 156. 
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I.180  Thus, the panels found that the Article XXIV reciprocity 
requirements were not modified by the provisions of Part IV.181 
Furthermore, the Bananas II Panel held that the use of the plural in 
the phrases of GATT Article XXIV “between the constituent 
territories” and “originating in such territories” made clear that only 
reciprocal agreements, “providing for an obligation to liberalize the 
trade in products originating in all of the constituent territories could 
be considered to establish a free-trade area within the meaning of 
Article XXIV:8(b).”182  As a consequence, the EC was required to 
request a formal waiver to keep its preferential trade regime for the 
ACP countries in conformity with the GATT/WTO.183  In an attempt 
to bring its relations with the ACP countries in line with the 
reciprocity requirement of GATT Article XXIV, the EC began 
negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements, aiming for reciprocal 
free trade, with West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern 
Africa, the Southern African Development Community, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific.184  Several authors have tried to examine 
the impact of the change from non-reciprocal to reciprocal free trade 
in EU-ACP relations.185  While the precise effect does not always 
seem clear, some Non-Governmental Organizations underline the 
negative impact of reciprocal free trade on the local farmers, 
 
 180. See Panel Report Bananas I, supra note 178, ¶¶ 369-72; Panel Report Bananas II, supra 
note 178, ¶¶ 160-64. 
 181. See Panel Report Bananas I, supra note 178, ¶¶ 369-72; Panel Report Bananas II, supra 
note 178, ¶¶ 160-64. 
 182. Panel Report Bananas II, supra note 178, ¶ 159 (emphasis added). 
 183. See Panel Report Bananas I, supra note 178, ¶ 241.  The first GATT waiver for the 
Lomé Conventions was granted on December 9, 1994.  Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé- 
Decision of 9 December 1994, ¶ 1, L/7604 (Dec. 9, 1994).  On October 14, 1996 the waiver was 
extended by the WTO.  Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé Extension of Waiver - Decision 
of 14 October 1996, ¶ 1, WT/L/186 (Oct. 14, 1996).  On November 14, 2001 the Doha Ministerial 
Conference provided a further waiver to the Cotonou Agreement, which is the successor to the 
Lomé Conventions, limited to December 31, 2007.  WTO, Ministerial Decision of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/15. 
 184. Desta, supra note 66; Borrmann et al., supra note 66. 
 185. See generally Stephen Karingi et al., Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa 
Economic Partnership Agreements (U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Africa, Africa Economic Policy 
Centre Work in Progress No. 10, 2005); Christopher Stevens & Jane Kennan, EU-ACP 
Economic Partnership Agreements: The Effects of Reciprocity (May 2005) (unpublished 
Briefing Paper of the Institute of Development Studies); Lawrence E. Hinkle & Maurice Schiff, 
Economic Partnership Agreements between Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU: a Development 
Perspective, 27 WORLD ECON. 1321 (2004); Matthew McQueen, ACP-EU Trade Cooperation 
after 2000: An Assessment of Reciprocal Trade Preferences, 36 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 669 
(1998). 
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employment, tax revenues, and even political stability in the ACP 
countries.186 
The requirement for reciprocal liberalization in free trade areas 
goes to the heart of the economic development problem.  GATS 
Article V explicitly states that, in interpreting the “substantially all” 
provision, flexibility is provided where developing countries are 
parties to RTAs.187  In contrast with GATS Article V, GATT Article 
XXIV does not include an explicit authorization for “flexibility” 
regarding RTAs involving developing countries.  However, some 
authors continue to argue that the Enabling Clause constitutes a 
sufficient basis for such flexibility.188  In the view of Jacques Berthelot, 
to say that the Enabling Clause merely authorizes regional 
arrangements amongst less-developed countries would be “totally 
redundant” as GATT Article XXIV already allows such RTAs.189  
Instead, Berthelot pleads for an integrated reading of paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the Enabling Clause.190  The wording in paragraph 1 strongly 
suggests that the contracting parties are developed, not developing, as 
it stipulates that “Contracting Parties may accord differential and 
more favourable treatment to developing countries.”191  Paragraph 
2(c) authorizes regional arrangements amongst less-developed 
countries.  The Enabling Clause makes clear that the provisions of 
paragraph 1 apply to what is provided for in paragraph 2.192  
According to this logic, contracting parties would be authorized to 
accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing 
countries in regional arrangements.  It is clear, however, that the 
current state of WTO law, as applied by the GATT Panels, does not 
reflect Berthelot’s reasoning. 
 
 186. Matt Griffith & Liz Stuart, Catholic Agency For Overseas Development, The Wrong 
Ointment: Why the EU’s Proposals for Free Trade with Africa will Not Heal its Scar of Poverty 
(2004), available at http://www.cafod.org.uk/var/storage/original/application/php7ywMCg.pdf; 
Cosmas Ochieng & Tom Sharman, Action Aid, Trade Traps: Why EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements Pose a Threat to Africa’s Development (2004), available at 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/_content/documents/Trade%20traps_782006_122739.pdf. 
 187. GATS, supra note 1, art. V:3(a). 
 188. Jacques Berthelot, Solidarité, David and Goliath: Argument against the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Countries 12-14 (2006), available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/Berthelot_ 
EN_191206_Solidarite_David-Goliath-argument-against-the-EPAs.pdf. 
 189. Id. at 13. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Enabling Clause, supra note 18, ¶ 2. 
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Proposal: The reciprocity issue could have important 
implications for developing countries.  Current studies on the 
economic impact of reciprocal RTAs between developing and 
developed countries are not leading to generally agreed conclusions.  
To provide a more solid basis for decision-making in the framework 
of the Doha Development Round (Doha Round or Round), a 
comprehensive impact study should be jointly commissioned by WTO 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) to determine the economic and social consequences of 
changing non-reciprocal benefits for regional groups of developing 
countries into reciprocal free trade. 
Furthermore, in view of the development focus of the Doha 
Round, the members should be ready “to redress the imbalance 
between [special and differential treatment] in Article V of GATS 
and its absence in the Article XXIV of GATT.”193  Such a step would 
be in full respect for the Round’s mandate which states explicitly that 
negotiations on rules for RTAs “shall take into account the 
developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.”194  In their 
interesting study on this issue, Axel Borrmann, Harald Grossmann 
and Georg Koopmann have explained that the concept of special and 
differential treatment for developing countries in the context of 
Article XXIV can take the form of flexibility as regards the breadth, 
the depth, and the speed of liberalization.195  Flexibility regarding the 
breadth of liberalization would allow the developing countries to 
apply less demanding levels of final trade coverage under the RTA.196  
Flexibility as to the depth of liberalization would permit developing 
countries to take temporary protective measures, in particular to 
protect infant industries.197  Flexibility as to the speed of liberalization 
would provide developing countries with a possibility for asymmetry 
 
 193. Stephen N. Karingi & Rémi Lang, Presentation by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa for the retreat of African Ambassadors and Negotiators based in 
Geneva on Development Benchmarks for the Hong Kong Ministerial, Lausanne: Negotiations 
on Rules with regard to Regional Trade Agreements 1 (Nov. 5-6, 2005).  See generally Rémi 
Lang, Renegotiating GATT Article XXIV: a Priority for African Countries Engaged in North-
South Trade Agreements (U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Africa, Africa Trade Pol’y Ctr. Work in 
Progress No. 33, 2006). 
 194. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, supra note 1, ¶ 29. 
 195. AXEL BORRMANN, HARALD GROSSMANN & GEORG KOOPMANN, FED. MINISTRY 
FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE WTO COMPATIBILITY OF THE ECONOMIC 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EU AND THE ACP STATES 34 (2005) (F.R.G.). 
 196. See id. at 35. 
 197. Id. 
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in tariff removal and the right to enjoy a lengthy transitional period 
for the entry into force of the RTA.198  The precise scope of the 
flexibility would need to be defined in function of the results of the 
joint WTO-UNCTAD study. 
4. The Specific Requirement for Customs Unions.  The fourth 
internal requirement deals specifically with customs unions.  GATT 
Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) contains the requirement that the parties to 
customs unions must apply “substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of commerce” in relation to third parties.199  According to 
the Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case, this provision implies 
that the “constituent members of a customs union are . . . required to 
apply a common external trade regime.”200  The Appellate Body adds 
that the term “substantially the same” offers a “certain degree of 
flexibility.”  However, it cautioned that this flexibility is limited: “It 
must not be forgotten that the word ‘substantially’ qualifies the words 
‘the same’.  Therefore, in our view, something closely approximating 
‘sameness’ is required by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii).”201 
5. The Period of Implementation.  The fifth internal 
requirement deals with the time period within which the RTA is to be 
formed.  GATT Article XXIV:5(c) states that “any interim 
agreement . . . shall include a plan and schedule for formation of . . . 
customs union or . . . free trade area within the reasonable period of 
time.”202  The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
GATT 1994 clarifies that the “reasonable period of time” referred to 
in paragraph 5(c) should be ten years and should only exceed this 
period of time in exceptional cases.  Where the parties believe that 
they need more time, the Understanding stipulates that they shall 
provide a full explanation to the Council for Trade in Goods.203 
Proposal: In order to avoid needless discussions and possible 
abuse, terms such as “reasonable” should be avoided in a 
constitutional text.  In this context, it would be appropriate to clarify 
that the ten-year principle included in the Uruguay Round 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV: 8(a)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 200. Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 49; see also COTTIER & 
OESCH, supra note 144, at 379. 
 201. Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 50. 
 202. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:5(c) (emphasis added). 
 203. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 16, ¶ 3. 
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Understanding is the rule: “[T]he right to depart from the general 
rule of ten years should be reserved for developing countries and 
[Least Developed Countries].”204 
B. The WTO’s External Requirements for RTAs 
1. The General Principle.  GATT Article XXIV:4 starts by 
stating that 
[t]he contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing 
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary 
agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the 
countries parties to such agreements.  They also recognize that the 
purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to 
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise 
barriers to trade of other contracting parties with such territories.205 
Already in the GATT 1947 era, the question arose of whether 
paragraph 4 creates a separate operational obligation on RTAs.206  
While the parties to RTAs have generally held the view that 
paragraph 4 can be seen as a purposive preamble without additional 
legal consequences, third countries have tended to interpret it as 
creating a separate obligation to be complied with by the RTA 
parties, independent of other Article XXIV provisions.207  The issue 
was first discussed in depth during the examination of the Treaty of 
Rome establishing the European Economic Community in 1957.208  
The Community’s representatives held that the paragraph was merely 
laying down a “general principle” that was translated into legal 
requirements in paragraphs 5 to 9.209  However, “[m]ost members of 
the Sub-Group were not prepared to accept this interpretation” and 
argued that consistency with paragraph 4 was something to be 
checked separately.210 
 
 204. BORRMANN, GROSSMANN & KOOPMANN, supra note 195, at 35. 
 205. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:4. 
 206. See GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 105, at 796-98. 
 207. Edwini Kessie, Counsellor, Presentation of the Council and Trade Negotiation 
Committee, WTO Rules on Regional Trade Agreements 20 (Dec. 4-8, 2006) (presentation 
available at the U.N. Institute for Training and Research, http://www.unitarny.org/mm/ 
File/RTA-Rules.pdf). 
 208. GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 105, at 796. 
 209. Id. at 797. 
 210. GATT, Report Submitted by the Committee on Treaty of Rome to the Contracting 
Parties on 29 November 1957, supra note 136, Annex I ¶ 3. 
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The Community’s position that “Article XXIV:4 did not 
constitute an obligation but an objective . . .”211 has in the meantime 
been endorsed by the WTO’s Appellate Body.  In the Turkey-
Textiles case it held, “Paragraph 4 contains purposive, and not 
operative language.  It does not set forth a separate obligation itself 
but, rather, sets forth the overriding and pervasive purpose for Article 
XXIV which is manifested in operative language in the specific 
obligations that are found elsewhere in Article XXIV.”212  The 
Appellate Body also concluded that “the purpose set forth in 
paragraph 4 informs the other relevant paragraphs of Article XXIV” 
and that these other paragraphs “must be interpreted in the light of 
the purpose . . . set forth in paragraph 4.”213 
2. The External Trade Consequences of RTAs.  In addition to 
its internal requirements that focus on the relationship between the 
parties to an RTA, GATT Article XXIV also contains external 
obligations that deal with the RTAs legal relationship with non-
members.  A crucial provision in this context states that the “duties 
and other regulations of commerce” imposed by a customs union or 
free-trade area in respect of contracting parties not parties to such 
union or free-trade area “shall not on the whole be higher or more 
restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of 
commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the 
formation of such [a customs] union . . . [or] free-trade area.”214 
During the Uruguay Round, the European Community argued 
that the purpose of the examination under GATT Article XXIV:5 
was to discuss the consequences of the customs union or free trade 
area “by looking at the total trade of the member States with the 
other contracting parties taken collectively.”215  Japan, however, 
strongly opposed an approach that would simply be based on a 
comparison of the average overall tariff rates before and after the 
formation of a customs union or free trade area.  “[T]o ensure that 
particular industries and non-member contracting parties would not 
be disproportionately affected by [a new] customs union [or a free 
 
 211. GATT, Report of the Working Party on Accession of Portugal and Spain to the 
European Communities, ¶ 22, L/6405 (Oct. 5, 1988). 
 212. Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 57. 
 213. Id. 
 214. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:5 (emphasis added). 
 215. Youri Devuyst, GATT Customs Union Provisions and the Uruguay Round: The 
European Community Experience, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 15, 29 (1992). 
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trade area], the approach favoured by the Japanese delegation 
[suggested taking] into account the specific product-by-product 
effects . . . on individual non-members.”  The EC rejected the 
Japanese proposal as being in total opposition to its well-established 
views.216  In the end, the Uruguay Round Understanding clarified that 
evaluations in application of Article XXIV:5 would have to “be based 
upon an overall assessment of weighed average tariff rates and of 
customs duties collected.”217  Settling the debate as to whether one 
should consider, when applying the test of Article XXIV:5, the bound 
rates or the applied rates of duty, the Understanding clarified that 
“the duties and charges to be taken into consideration shall be the 
applied rates of duty.”218  With respect to the “overall assessment of 
the incidence of other regulations of commerce for which 
quantification and aggregation are difficult,” the Uruguay Round 
Understanding recognized that “the examination of individual 
measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may 
be required.”219  The Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case 
confirmed this recognition by stating that “for the purpose of the 
overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of commerce 
for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the 
examination of individual measures, regulations, products covered 
and trade flows affected may be required.”220 
In general, the Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case held 
that the test for assessing whether a specific customs union is 
compatible with GATT Article XXIV:5 is an “economic” one.221  
 
 216. Id. at 28-29. 
 217. The Understanding stipulates that “[t]his assessment shall be based on import statistics 
for a previous representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis 
and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin.  The Secretariat shall 
compute the weighed average tariff rates and customs duties collected in accordance with the 
methodology used in the assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay Round.”  Understanding on 
Article XXIV, supra note 16, ¶ 2. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id.; Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 54. 
 221. Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 55.  See also WTO 
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 140, ¶ 623.  Following Jacob Viner’s seminal work on customs 
unions, JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 41-81 (1950), some lawyers have proposed 
to reformulate the wording of GATT Article XXIV to underline that RTAs should serve trade 
creation and not trade diversion.  Trade creation occurs when the establishment of an RTA 
stimulates a member country to replace goods previously produced at home (at a relatively 
higher cost) with goods imported from another member (at relatively lower costs).  Trade 
creation may also be the result of the economic growth that is induced by an RTA and results in 
higher amounts of imports from the outside world.  Trade diversion takes place when goods 
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However, both practitioners and academics have argued that such 
economic tests suffer from three important shortcomings.  First, the 
Uruguay Round compromise related to the calculation of the 
“general incidence of duties and other regulations of commerce” and 
did not foster agreement on the final conclusion to be drawn from 
such economic tests in specific cases.  The Understanding still 
provides 
sufficient room for members . . . to express diverging opinions on 
the relative weight to be attached to the overall assessment versus a 
product-specific or country-specific assessment.  Moreover, even if 
attention goes mainly to the overall assessment of a customs 
union’s global tariff schedule, past Article XXIV:5 exercises have 
shown that an evaluation of weighted average tariff rates on the 
one hand and of customs duties collected on the other hand does 
not necessarily lead to a similar conclusion.222 
Second, among expert economists, there is no agreement on the 
methodology to be used for measuring the impact of an RTA: 
“empirical studies [on the economic impact of RTAs] yield diverse 
conclusions according to the particular methodological assumptions 
and limitations of the economic models they employ.”223  Some have 
even argued that it is simply impossible to arrive at any sound result 
on the basis of economic analysis.  Ambassador Ernest H. Preeg, a 
U.S. foreign service officer with twenty-five years of experience in 
trade diplomacy, has come to the conclusion that “the actual trade 
impact of regional free trade arrangements . . . cannot be measured 
with precision.”224  Likewise, for Frederick M. Abbott, “the passage of 
 
previously imported from the outside world are replaced, after the formation of an RTA, by 
higher-cost production from within the RTA.  See DAM, supra note 23, at 291-95. 
 222. Devuyst, supra note 215, at 29. 
 223. Cho, supra note 23, at 434.  On the basis of a major review of the empirical literature on 
RTAs, Chantal Pohl Nielsen concludes “that the quantitative assessments of PTAs are almost as 
disparate in their conclusions as the theories underlying them.”  CHANTAL POHL NIELSEN, 
REGIONAL AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
IDENTIFICATION OF FUTURE STEPS 109 (Danish Research Inst. Food Econ., Report No. 155, 
2003). 
 224. Ernest H. Preeg, The Compatibility of Regional Economic Blocs and the GATT, 526 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 164, 167 (1993).  A similar conclusion was reached when 
numerous U.S. agencies tried to foresee the economic consequences of the EC’s Internal 
Market project in 1988-1992.  The most comprehensive American report on this topic found 
that “customs union theory . . . cannot predict whether trade with non-member countries will 
increase or decrease.”  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUBL’N NO. 2204, THE EFFECTS OF 
GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED 
STATES, at vi (1989).  On the one hand, “the internal liberalization . . . will . . . tend to increase 
trade among EC countries at the expense of existing trade with more efficient producers in the 
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time [has given] rise to the sanguine conclusion that the trade 
creation/trade diversion effects of RTAs are a priori indeterminate 
under the current state of the economic art.”225  Jürgen Huber agrees: 
“ex ante—and that is when the [GATT has] to decide about the 
compliance with Art. XXIV—there is just no way to predict the 
impact that can be expected from [an RTA].”226  The third problem is 
that globalization of investment and production has increasingly 
undermined the relevance of such concepts as trade creation and 
diversion because they were intended to judge the effects of RTAs on 
geographically defined national economies.227  According to Augusto 
de la Torre and Margaret R. Kelly of the International Monetary 
Fund, the assessment of RTAs should take into account that “the 
gains from trade creation would also accrue to firms of non-member 
countries with a physical presence (branches or subsidiaries) in the 
region or with other forms of linkage to firms in the region (licensing 
agreements, cross-shareholding arrangements, strategic alliances, and 
so on).”228 
Proposal: As the previous paragraph has made clear, economists, 
lawyers, and practitioners alike agree that there is simply no way to 
predict in mathematical terms and with any degree of precision and 
consensus what the overall impact of an RTA is going to be.  
Therefore, as Frederick M. Abbott has written, this type of exercise is 
“not the appropriate end of inquiry.”229  Frieder Roessler, the former 
Director of GATT’s Legal Service, agrees with this conclusion.  In his 
view, the legal status of RTAs should not be made dependent on 
calculated, but necessarily shaky, predictions of their economic 
 
United States and other nonmember countries.”  Id.  On the other hand, “[p]roducers in 
nonmember countries will benefit if the EC 1992 program boosts growth in the EC.”  Id. 
 225. Frederick M. Abbott, GATT and the European Community: A Formula for Peaceful 
Coexistence, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 n.16 (1990). 
 226. Jürgen Huber, The Practice of GATT in Examining Regional Arrangements under 
Article XXIV, 19 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 281, 295 (1981).  Along similar lines, see generally 
Daniella Markheim, A Note on Predicting the Trade Effects of Economic Integration and Other 
Preferential Trade Agreements: An Assessment, 32 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 103 (1994); 
Martin Wolf, Is there a Case for Free Trade Areas?: Comments, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND 
U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 42, at 90. 
 227. See AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE & MARGARET R. KELLY, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 5 (1992). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Abbott, supra note 225, at 7 n.16. 
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impact.230  In other words, “general incidence” calculations could – at 
most—have an indicative value.  They should not determine the 
WTO’s final stance towards RTAs.  Instead, the WTO’s assessment 
of RTAs should increasingly focus on the continuing evaluation of its 
concrete trade policy measures. According to economists Alexis 
Jacquemin and André Sapir, RTAs can be beneficial to world trade, 
but only provided that their external trade policy is geared toward a 
cooperative and welfare creating game with other regions and 
countries.231  This cannot be measured or estimated in advance, but 
rather, requires the examination of the RTA’s external trade policy 
instruments on a sectoral basis.232  In other words, an effective 
assessment of RTAs “requires an understanding of the detail” of their 
commercial policy, as it evolves over time.233  This point underscores 
the importance of a functioning and permanent monitoring system for 
RTAs, as recommended in Part IV.E of this article.  The current 
CRTA reviews do not, however, include such a concrete and 
permanent analysis of RTA trade policy measures. 
3. The Specific Requirement for Customs Unions: 
Compensatory Adjustment.  The second external requirement on 
RTAs concerns the common customs duties that are adopted by the 
members of a customs union.  If, in the creation of a customs union, a 
WTO member increases a rate of duty inconsistently with what is 
listed in its schedule of concessions, the customs union is obliged to 
enter into compensatory adjustment negotiations with the “outside” 
contracting parties.234  According to GATT Article XXIV:6, the 
members of a customs union must thus offer compensatory 
adjustment when bound tariffs have been raised following the 
 
 230. See Frieder Roessler, The Relationship between Regional Integration Agreements and 
the Multilateral Trade Order, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 
311, 313 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1993). 
 231. Alexis Jacquemin & André Sapir, Europe Post-1992: Internal and External 
Liberalization, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 166, 169-70 (1991). 
 232. André Sapir, Regional Integration in Europe, 102 ECON. J. 1491, 1494-99 (1992). 
 233. Stephen Woolcock, The European Acquis and Multilateral Trade Rules: Are they 
Compatible?, 31 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 539, 545 (1993). 
 234. See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:6.  Since free trade areas do not lead the 
establishment of a common external trade policy and a common customs tariff, the creation of a 
free trade area does not involve the unbinding of tariff schedules vis-à-vis third countries. As a 
result, free trade areas do not need to go through the compensatory adjustment exercise under 
GATT Article XXIV:6. 
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formation or the enlargement of the union.235  Compensatory 
adjustment negotiations following the formation of a customs union 
are a logical consequence of the GATT system itself.  As was 
explained in Part II, under GATT Article II, the contracting parties 
undertake the commitment to levy no more than the tariffs bound in 
their schedule of concessions.236  If the formation of a customs union 
leads to an increase in bound tariffs, the other contracting parties 
should, according to the GATT logic, be compensated.  In the 
wording of GATT Article XXVIII, the aim is “to maintain a general 
level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions.”237  In 
practice, the contracting parties “forming a customs union must 
indicate the bound tariffs which they intend to modify or withdraw in 
the establishment of the common customs tariff as well as the 
compensatory adjustment which they are prepared to offer.”238  Those 
contracting parties “with which the withdrawn tariff concessions were 
initially negotiated or which have a principal supplying interest may 
claim compensation for a breach of bindings.”239  If no negotiated 
agreement can be reached on the correct amount of compensation 
required, Article XXVIII:3 allows the parties to the customs union to 
move ahead with the modification of their concessions.240  However, 
in such a case, the parties claiming compensation as initial negotiator 
or principal supplier are equally free to withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions within a six-month period.241 
In the pre-Uruguay Round era, the main problem during the 
bilateral Article XXIV:6 negotiations was related to the so-called 
credit-debit debate.242  While calculating the amount of compensatory 
adjustment that was due to the non-members following the formation 
of a customs union’s common customs tariff, the customs union often 
claimed credits for tariff reductions in order to offset the debits 
resulting from the increase of bound duties.  Customs union requests 
 
 235. See id.; see also GATS, supra note 1, art. V:5 (“If, in the conclusion, enlargement or any 
significant modification of any [RTA in services], a Member intends to withdraw or modify a 
specific commitment inconsistently with the terms and conditions set out in its Schedule, it shall 
provide at least 90 days advance notice of such modification or withdrawal and the procedure 
set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article XXI shall apply”). 
 236. See sources cited supra notes 74-75. 
 237. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXVIII:2. 
 238. Devuyst, supra note 215, at 21. 
 239. Id. 
 240. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXVIII:3(a). 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Devuyst, supra note 215, at 23-25. 
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for internal credits that have been within one tariff-line have generally 
been “relatively uncontested” by the contracting parties.243  However, 
customs union requests for external credits and for reverse 
compensation have proved controversial.244  Requests for external 
credits by the parties to a customs union transgress a single tariff-line.  
But the outsiders to customs unions have traditionally aimed for 
product-specific compensation, and consequently, tended to reject 
requests for external credits.245  In the Article XXIV:6 negotiations 
with the United States following the creation of the European 
Economic Community, the EC’s request for the acceptance of 
external credits formed a major problem.246  Referring to specific U.S. 
industries that would be injured by the creation of the common 
customs tariff, the chairman of the U.S. delegation argued that there 
was “no means of compensating such industries [as the automobile 
sector] by credits accruing from the concessions to other industries 
[such as the chemical sector].”247  On occasion, the EC has gone 
beyond requests for external credits by claiming reverse 
compensation.248  This means that the EC requested compensation 
from its major trading partners because it deemed that—following an 
enlargement with new member states—the general incidence of the 
duties of those new EC member states decreased substantially in 
comparison with the tariffs applied before the accession.249  Such 
demands have been categorically dismissed by the “outsiders” as 
being “without foundation” in the GATT.250 
During the Uruguay Round, the negotiators agreed that there is 
no obligation on third parties to accept requests for reverse 
compensation.251  Regarding external credits, the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV recognizes that 
 
 243. Id. at 23.  The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV recognizes internal 
credits by stating that the calculation of compensation must take “due account shall be taken of 
reductions of duties on the same tariff line made by other constituents of the customs union 
upon its formation.”  Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 16, ¶ 5. 
 244. See Devuyst, supra note 215, at 23-25. 
 245. Id. at 24. 
 246. Id. 
 247. European Commission, Article XXIV:6 Tariff Negotiations U.S./EEC, GATT 422/61, 4 
(Feb. 10, 1961). 
 248. This was notably the case following the EC’s enlargement with Greece in 1981.  See 
generally European Commission, U.S. Position in GATT on Greece’s Accession to the EEC 
(July 9, 1982). 
 249. Devuyst,  supra note 215, at 24-25. 
 250. Id. at 25. 
 251. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 16, ¶ 6. 
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a customs union may “offer compensation, which may take the form 
of reductions of duties on other tariff lines.  Such an offer shall be 
taken into consideration by the members having negotiating rights in 
the binding being modified or withdrawn.”252  The Uruguay Round 
clarification has been helpful during the concrete GATT Article 
XXIV:6 negotiations.  During the EEC’s creation and subsequent 
enlargements in the pre-Uruguay Round years, compensatory 
adjustment negotiations invariably resulted in trade disputes with the 
United States.253  As a result of the clarification on the credits that can 
be requested, the GATT Article XXIV:6 deals following the EC’s 
enlargements of 1995 and 2004 have been concluded without major 
drama.254 
IV.  THE WTO’S PROCEDURAL  
STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING RTAS: ANALYSIS OF THE 
DOHA ROUND’S TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM AND 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
Transparency is an essential concept in the WTO: “Members 
recognize the inherent value of domestic transparency of government 
decision-making on trade policy matters for both Members’ 
economies and the multilateral trading system, and agree to 
encourage and promote greater transparency . . . .”255  Transparency is 
 
 252. Id. ¶ 5. 
 253. Devuyst, supra note 215, at 25. See generally Vera Erdmann-Keefer, The Corn War: A 
Euro-American Trade Dispute, in THE EVOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR 241 
(Reinhardt Rummel ed., 1990); George N. Yannopoulos, United States Trade Interests and EC 
Enlargement, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 49 (1987). 
 254. For the agreement under GATT art. XXIV:6 between the EC and the United States 
following the  EC’s enlargement to include Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, see U.S. Trade 
Compliance Center, European Union Enlargement Compensation Agreement (July 22, 1996), 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_002819.asp.  A similar 
agreement was reached following the EC’s enlargement to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta in 2004.  See Press 
Release, U.S. Trade Representative, United States and European Communities Reach 
Agreement on Enlargement Compensation Package (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/November/United_States_European_Communities_R
each_Agreement_on_Enlargement_Compensation_Package.html. 
 255. WTO, Annex 3: Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 380, 380 (1999) 
[hereinafter TPRM]; see also Meinhard Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation 
for WTO/GATT Law?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111, 119 (2001); K. G. Anthony Hill, former 
Ambassador from Jamaica to the U.N, Remarks at the WTO Public Symposium – WTO after 
10 Years: Global Problems and Multilateral Solutions: Transparency and Participation in the 
National Trade Policy Process (Apr. 20, 2005), www.wto.org/english/news_e/events_e/ 
symp05_e/hill5_e.doc; MAVROIDIS, supra note 74, at 270; see generally Sylvia Ostry, China and 
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of particular importance with respect to RTAs as they are an 
exception to the key MFN-principle.  In Article XXIV:7(a), GATT 
1947 provides that contracting parties should “promptly notify [their 
Agreement to] the contracting parties and shall make available to them 
such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable 
them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties 
as they may deem appropriate.”256  GATS Article V:7(a) stipulates 
that members which are parties to any RTA covering trade in services 
shall promptly notify such agreement, enlargement or modification of 
that agreement.  Members that are parties to an RTA that is 
implemented on the basis of a time-frame shall report periodically on 
its implementation.257  The Enabling Clause provides in paragraph 4 
that “[a]ny contracting party taking action to introduce an 
arrangement . . . or subsequently taking action to introduce 
modification or withdrawal of the differential and more favourable 
treatment so provided shall: (a) notify the contracting parties and 
furnish them with all the information they deem appropriate relating to 
such action. . . .”258 
As noted in the introduction, the WTO assessment of RTAs has 
not been successful.  None of the RTAs notified to the WTO have 
been formally approved.  When WTO members agreed at the Doha 
Ministerial Conference to launch negotiations in the area of the WTO 
rules, provisions applying to regional trade agreements were included 
in the mandate.259  Taking developmental aspects into account, the 
WTO members agreed to start negotiations that would improve 
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions 
applying to RTAs.  The negotiations took place in the Negotiation 
Group on Rules (NGR) that reports to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee (TNC).  “Several delegations . . . stressed the need to 
improve the transparency of RTAs and the efficiency of the 
 
the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (1998); Carl-
Sebastian Zoellner, Note, Transparency: an Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle in 
International Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 579 (2006). 
 256. GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:7(a). 
 257. GATS, supra note 1, art. V:7(b). 
 258. Enabling Clause, supra note 18, at 204; WTO, TECHNICAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK 
ON NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS at 2, 
WT/TC/NOTIF/REG/1 (1996)  [hereinafter WTO TECHNICAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK]. 
 259. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, supra note 1, ¶ 29 (“We also 
agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the 
existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements.  The negotiations shall take 
into account the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.”). 
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procedures related to the examination of RTAs, noting that the 
CRTA [Committee on Regional Trade Agreements] ha[s] been 
unable to adequately fulfill its mandate of reviewing RTAs and 
overseeing their implementation.”260  At the meeting of November 25-
27, 2002, Turkey submitted a paper to the NGR which “indicated that 
[the] basic transparency requirements such as notification, scope of 
information to be submitted, periodical reporting, examination 
process and determining the legal status of the examination reports of 
the [CRTA] appeared” to be subjects where agreement would be 
possible and, therefore, could be “a good starting-point for the 
negotiations.”261  Other members submitted constructive proposals on 
the theme.262  On July 10, 2006, after long process of discussing and 
negotiating, the NGR formally approved a new Transparency 
Mechanism for all RTAs, and decided to let the new transparency 
mechanism enter into force on a provisional basis.263  The following 
paragraphs will detail the features of the Transparency Mechanism 
against the background of the WTO’s practice over the last decades. 
A. The Competent Body for the Examination of RTAs 
In the old days of GATT 1947, examination of RTAs was 
conducted by individual working parties.264  Often, several working 
parties co-existed, each assessing different RTAs.  This fragmented 
approach neither contributed to coherence, nor to an orderly 
discussion of systemic issues which are common to RTAs.  To remedy 
these problems, the WTO General Council established the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) in February 
1996.265  The CRTA’s role is to carry out the examination of RTAs; to 
consider and make appropriate recommendations on the requirement 
for biennial reporting on their operation; to develop procedures to 
facilitate and improve the examination process; and to consider the 
 
 260. Negotiating Group on Rules, Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 6 & 8 May 2002, 
¶ 40, TN/RL/M/2 (June 11, 2002). 
 261. Negotiating Group on Rules, Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 25-27 November 
2002, ¶ 26, TN/RL/M/5 (Jan. 8, 2003); Negotiating Group on Rules, Submission on Regional 
Trade Agreements by Turkey, at 2, TN/RL/W/32 (Nov. 25, 2002). 
 262. See generally Negotiating Group on Rules, Joint Communication from Australia; Chile; 
Hong Kong,China; Korea and New Zealand, Submission on Regional Trade Agreements, 
TN/RL/W/117 (June 11, 2003) (suggesting changes to RTAs). 
 263. General Council, Meeting of 14-15 December 2006, at 3, WT/GC/M/106 (Mar. 1, 2007). 
 264. GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 105, at 814-15. 
 265. General Council, Decision of 6 February 1996, WT/L/127 (Feb. 7, 1996). 
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systemic implications of such agreements and regional initiatives for 
the multilateral trading system and the relationship between them.266 
In WTO practice, RTAs falling under GATT Article XXIV are 
notified to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) which is in charge 
of adopting the terms of reference and of transferring the agreement 
to the CRTA for examination.267  RTAs covering trade in services 
concluded by any WTO members, whether developed or developing, 
are notified to the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) which is free 
to decide whether to pass the agreement to the CRTA for 
examination.268  Unlike mandatory examinations of RTAs notified 
under GATT Article XXIV, these examinations are optional.269  The 
notification of RTAs falling under the Enabling Clause is made to the 
Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).  The agreement is, 
then, placed on the agenda of the CTD meeting where a debate is 
held.  Generally, however, no in-depth examination in the CRTA is 
requested.270 
During the course of the Doha Round, one of the issues debated 
was whether all RTAs should be notified to one single body or 
whether RTAs under the GATT 1994 and the GATS should be 
reviewed separately from the RTAs concluded under the Enabling 
Clause.271  For the Group of African and Least Developed Countries 
(LDC), bringing “Enabling Clause RTAs” under CRTA review was 
“contrary to the spirit of the WTO framework and of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration.”  They contended that these RTAs should 
continue to be notified to the Committee on Trade and Development 
(CTD).272  The final version of the Transparency Mechanism gave 
satisfaction to the LDC on this point.  The bodies entrusted with the 
implementation of the transparency mechanism continue to be the 
CRTA for RTAs falling under GATT Article XXIV and GATS 
Article V and the CTD for RTAs falling under paragraph 2(c) of the 
Enabling Clause.  For purposes of performing the functions 
 
 266. Id. ¶ I. 
 267. Work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See Negotiating Group on Rules, supra note 260, ¶ 36. 
 272. Negotiating Group on Rules, supra note 148, ¶ 12. 
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established under the Transparency Mechanism, the CTD shall 
convene in dedicated session.273 
B. The Information to be Provided 
The examination of notified RTAs is conducted on the basis of 
information provided by the parties.  GATT Article XXIV:7(a) 
requires WTO members to provide information on a proposed free 
trade area or customs union as they deem appropriate.  It does not lay 
down any specific notification format to be followed by countries 
wishing to form a regional trading arrangement.274  GATS Article 
V:7(a) provides without further instructions that any member 
entering into an agreement shall make relevant information available 
to the Council for Trade in Services as the latter may request it.275  
Paragraph 4(a) of the Enabling Clause states that any member taking 
action to introduce an arrangement shall provide other contracting 
parties with all information, as the former considers appropriate.  
However, the Enabling Clause “does not lay down any specific format 
to be followed by developing countries wishing to grant preferences to 
each other.”276 
In an attempt to clarify matters, the WTO’s Technical 
Cooperation Handbook on Notification Requirements of 1996 
specifies that “the notification is expected to indicate the parties to the 
arrangement, the coverage of the agreement, whether it is a free-trade 
area or a customs union or an interim agreement.”277  In the case of an 
interim agreement, the transitional period must be stated.  A copy of 
the Treaty or Agreement between the parties must be annexed to the 
Notification.278  Also in 1996, the Chairman of the CRTA worked out a 
Standard Format for Information on Regional Trade Agreements.  
While extensive in scope, the Standard Format “should be viewed as 
Guidelines by the Chairman as to basic information that could be 
provided by parties notifying regional trade agreements to the 
 
 273. WTO Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, supra note 1, ¶ 18. 
 274. See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XXIV:7(a) 
 275. See GATS, supra note 1, art. V:7(a) 
 276. WTO TECHNICAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK, supra note 258, at 2; see also Enabling 
Clause, supra note 18, at 204. 
 277. WTO TECHNICAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK, supra note 258, at 3. 
 278. Id. 
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WTO.”279  In other words, the parties could adhere to the Standard 
Format on a voluntary basis, but they were not obliged to do so.280 
The clarifications of 1996 did not resolve the discussions between 
the members on the quantitative and qualitative nature of the 
statistics that had to be submitted by the parties. Some members 
insisted that a maximum possible amount of statistics was very 
important for assessing the conformity of RTAs with WTO rules and 
to understand how the economies of parties to RTAs were adjusting 
to the evolution of trade patterns.281  Others argued that detailed 
statistics were not only hard to obtain, but often misleading.282  The 
Doha Round Transparency Mechanism hardly contributes to settling 
the matter.  The Transparency Mechanism’s inventory of data that 
the RTA parties are expected to make available is less comprehensive 
than the Standard Format of 1996.283  Furthermore, as it is staying at a 
high level of generality, the Transparency Mechanism is unlikely to 
bring an end to the long-lasting discussions on the level of 
sophistication that is required of the statistical information to be 
submitted. 
C. The Role of the WTO Secretariat 
With respect to the concrete examination of RTAs by the CRTA 
and the CTD, the Doha Round Transparency Mechanism contains an 
important novelty.  In the past, the WTO Secretariat played only a 
marginal role in the assessment of RTAs.  Under the Transparency 
Mechanism, “the WTO Secretariat, on its own responsibility and in 
full consultation with the parties, shall prepare a factual presentation 
of the RTA.”284  This procedure seems comparable to what exists 
under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).285  In preparing 
the factual presentation, the WTO Secretariat must refrain from any 
 
 279. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Standard Format for Information on 
Regional Trade Agreements, at 1, WT/REG/W/6 (Aug. 15, 1996). 
 280. See id. 
 281. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of “Systematic” Issues Related to 
Regional Trade Agreements, ¶ 18(a), WT/REG/W/37 (Mar. 2, 2000). 
 282. Id. ¶ 18(b). 
 283. See WTO Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, supra note 1, Annex paras. 2-4. 
 284. Id. ¶ 7. 
 285. For information regarding TPRM, see generally Asif H. Qureshi, The New GATT 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism: An Exercise in Transparency or “Enforcement”?, 24 J. WORLD 
TRADE 147 (1990); Victoria Curzon-Price, GATT’s New Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 14 
WORLD ECON. 227 (1991); Petros C. Mavroidis, Surveillance Schemes: The GATT’s New Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 374 (1992). 
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value judgment.  The presentation shall be primarily based on the 
information provided by the parties.  “[I]f necessary, the WTO 
Secretariat may also use data available from other sources, taking 
into account the views of the parties in furtherance of factual 
accuracy.”286  Contrary to what had been suggested in the academic 
literature, the Transparency Mechanism leaves no doubt that the 
WTO Secretariat’s factual presentation shall not be used as a basis for 
dispute settlement procedures or to create new rights and obligations 
for members.287  If the TPRM may serve as precedent, the WTO 
Secretariat’s reporting duty is likely to bring coherence and 
consistency to the assessment process.  Furthermore, it will provide 
an objective starting point for the examination.  As such, it constitutes 
a major improvement in the surveillance process.288 
The WTO Secretariat’s factual presentation, as well as any 
additional information submitted by the parties, shall be circulated 
in all WTO official languages not less than eight weeks in advance 
of the meeting devoted to the consideration of the RTA. 
As a rule, a single formal meeting will be devoted to consider each 
notified RTA; any additional exchange of information should take 
place in written form.289 
In a further push for transparency, the Doha Round Mechanism 
states that: 
the WTO Secretariat shall establish and maintain an updated 
electronic database on individual RTAs.  This database shall 
include relevant tariff and trade-related information, and give 
access to all written material related to announced or notified 
RTAs available at the WTO.  The RTA database should be 
structured so as to be easily accessible to the public.290 
D. The Timing of the Notification 
1. Early Announcement.  As to the timing of the assessment 
exercise, some delegations expressed support for early notification.  
Australia and Hong Kong, for example, interpreted the term “shall 
promptly notify” to mean that the notification and submission of 
information should take place before the entry into force of the 
 
 286. WTO Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, supra note 1, ¶ 9. 
 287. But see Cottier & Foltea, supra note 21, at 71 (advocating a stronger monitoring role 
for the WTO Secretariat). 
 288. See sources cited supra note 285. 
 289. WTO Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, supra note 1, ¶¶ 11-12. 
 290. Id. ¶ 21. 
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agreement.291  However, members frequently participating in RTAs 
refused an obligation to formally notify their agreements before the 
entry into force.292  Instead, the Doha negotiators agreed on a two-
stage process.293 
The first phase is called the “early announcement.”  Without 
affecting the substance and the timing of the notification required 
under GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V or the Enabling Clause, 
nor affecting members’ rights and obligations under the WTO 
agreements in any way, the Doha Round negotiators agreed on the 
usefulness of an “early announcement” of pending RTAs.  This 
implies that members participating in negotiations aimed at the 
conclusion of an RTA 
. . . shall endeavour to so inform the WTO. 
Members parties to a newly signed RTA shall convey to the WTO, 
in so far as and when it is publicly available, information on the 
RTA, including its official name, scope and date of signature, any 
foreseen timetable for its entry into force or provisional 
application, relevant contact points and/or website addresses, and 
any other relevant unrestricted information.294 
This information will be posted on the WTO website.295 
2. Notification in the Strict Sense.  The second phase covers the 
notification in the strict sense.  The Transparency Mechanism 
stipulates that notification “shall take place as early as possible.  As a 
rule, it will occur no later than directly following the parties’ 
ratification of the RTA or any party’s decision on application of the 
relevant parts of an agreement, and before the application of 
preferential treatment between the parties.”296  The Mechanism adds 
that the WTO consideration of a notified RTA “shall be normally 
concluded in a period not exceeding one year after the date of 
notification.”297  The submission of the required information should, 
normally, “not exceed ten weeks— or 20 weeks in the case of RTAs 
 
 291. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, supra note 281, ¶ 13(a). 
 292. See Negotiating Group on Rules, Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 8-10 July 
2002, at 7, TN/RL/M/3 (Aug. 1, 2002). 
 293. Negotiating Group on Rules, supra note 147, ¶ 16. 
 294. WTO Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
 295. Id. ¶ 2. 
 296. Id. ¶ 3. 
 297. Id. ¶ 6. 
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involving only developing countries— after the date of notification of 
the agreement.”298 
To fight non-notification, the Doha Round agreed that “[a]ny 
Member may, at any time, bring to the attention of the relevant WTO 
body information on any RTA that it considers ought to have been 
submitted to Members in the framework of th[e] Transparency 
Mechanism.”299 
3. The Subsequent Notification and Reporting of Changes to 
RTAs.  GATS Article V:7(a) makes clear that parties to any RTA 
covering trade in services shall also notify the enlargement or 
modification of that agreement.  Moreover, under GATS, parties to 
an RTA that is implemented on the basis of a time-frame are obliged 
to report periodically on its implementation.300  GATT Article XXIV 
does not include explicit provisions on the notification or reporting of 
modifications or extensions of existing customs unions or free trade 
areas.  By way of the Uruguay Round Understanding on the 
interpretation of Article XXIV, it was nevertheless agreed that parties 
to an interim agreement should notify substantial changes in an RTA’s 
plan and schedule to the Council on Trade in Goods.301  If requested, 
the Council will examine the changes.302  Customs unions and 
constituents of free-trade areas shall, furthermore, report periodically 
to the Council on Trade in Goods on the operation of the relevant 
agreement.  Any significant changes and/or developments in the 
agreement should be reported as they occur.303  In practice, little 
progress has been achieved with the implementation of this 
instruction. 
The Doha Round Transparency Mechanism goes only slightly 
beyond these existing provisions.  It adds that the required 
notification of changes affecting the implementation of an RTA, or 
the operation of an already implemented RTA, shall take place “as 
soon as possible after the changes occur.”304  The Transparency 
Mechanism clarifies that the 
 
 298. Id. ¶ 8. 
 299. Id. ¶ 20. 
 300. GATS, supra note 1, art. V:7(a)-(b). 
 301. Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 16, ¶ 9. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. ¶ 11. 
 304. WTO Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, supra note 1, ¶ 14. 
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[c]hanges to be notified include, inter alia, modifications to the 
preferential treatment between the parties and to the RTA’s 
disciplines.  The parties shall provide a summary of the changes 
made, as well as any related texts, schedules, annexes and 
protocols, in one of the WTO official languages and, if available, in 
electronically exploitable format.305 
It is also specified that the parties to an RTA shall—at the end of the 
RTA’s implementation period—“submit to the WTO a short written 
report on the realization of the liberalization commitments in the 
RTA as originally notified.  Upon request, the relevant WTO body 
shall provide an adequate opportunity for an exchange of views on 
the communications submitted.”306 
E. The Lack of Effective Monitoring After the Formative Stage of 
RTAs 
The Doha Round Transparency Mechanism for RTAs includes a 
number of useful clarifications.  The most significant innovation is the 
WTO Secretariat in the examination of RTAs.  Practice in the WTO’s 
TPRM has indicated that the involvement of the WTO Secretariat 
brings coherence, professionalism and objectivity to the assessment of 
the trade policies of the members.307  Furthermore, the literature on 
the compliance with international legal commitments underlines that 
the involvement of the international secretariat to a treaty 
organization in the reporting process is generally beneficial because 
the secretariat often fulfils an educational role in guiding the parties 
with respect to the techniques that have been or can be used to fulfill 
their obligations.308  It is likely that the Secretariat’s role in the 
examination of RTAs will fulfill a similar role. 
The most important shortcoming of the Transparency 
Mechanism concerns the monitoring of RTAs after their formal 
notification.  This is important.  The practical effect of RTAs on the 
multilateral trade system can hardly be studied upon their 
formation.309  As RTAs are dynamic structures, a proper surveillance 
regime requires a permanent monitoring system, also after their 
formative stage.  As Jeffrey J. Schott has argued, 
 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. 
 307. See generally ASIF H. QURESHI, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE NORMS, ch. 8 (1996); DONALD B. KEESING, IMPROVING TRADE 
POLICY REVIEWS IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1998). 
 308. Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 32, at 199. 
 309. See Cho, supra note 23, at 421. 
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the WTO should undertake more active surveillance after pacts 
enter into force.  Most of the time, when it does take place, WTO 
monitoring of regional pacts examines only what was negotiated 
and whether it comports with GATT and GATS obligations.  
However, what is really important is how the agreements are 
implemented and what effects they have on international trade and 
investment. That requires ex post analysis.310 
Even skeptical observers such as Richard Blackhurst and David 
Henderson conclude that “knowledge that there will be such 
surveillance is very likely to have an a priori impact on the contents of 
the agreement.”311 
In spite of the importance given to “subsequent notification and 
reporting” in the literature, the Transparency Mechanism’s provisions 
do not constitute a significant step forward in comparison with the 
pre-Doha regime for RTAs.  Already under the pre-Doha rules, the 
CRTA could, in theory, have fulfilled a permanent review function.  
In 2001, the CRTA adopted a timetable for the submission of biennial 
RTA reports.312  In practice, the planned biennial reporting did not 
work well.  It was regularly postponed, notably because of the late 
submission of the required information by the parties concerned and 
because of the already burdensome workload of delegations in the 
context of the Doha Round.313 
In addition to the possible monitoring of RTAs by the CRTA, 
the Uruguay Round texts on the TPRM foresaw “the review of 
entities having a common external policy.”314  The TPRM is the 
successful multilateral peer review system designed to provide a 
collective appreciation and understanding of the full range of 
members’ trade policies and practices and their impact on the 
multilateral trading system.315  All WTO members are reviewed by the 
 
 310. Schott, supra note 170, at 18. 
 311. Richard Blackhurst & David Henderson, Regional Integration Agreements, World 
Integration and the GATT, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 
408, 428 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1993). 
 312. WTO, Report (2002) of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to the General 
Council, Attachment 3, WT/REG/11 (Nov. 25, 2002). 
 313. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. 
 314. TPRM, supra note 255, at 381. 
 315. As it has been successful, activists have tried to link their special interest subjects to the 
TPRM.  See generally Barbara Evers, GAPRESEARCH.ORG, Linking Trade and Poverty: 
Reinventing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (2003), http://www.gapresearch.org/ 
governance/Evers-TPRM-WEB-31july03.pdf; Barbara Evers, GAPRESEARCH.ORG, Gender, 
International Trade and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Conceptual Reference Points for 
UNCTAD (2002), http://www.gapresearch.org/governance/BE%20evers%20unctad%20 
paper1.pdf; Int’l Labour Org., Reviewing Labour Rights Through the Trade Policy Review 
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Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), the frequency of each country’s 
review varying according to its share of world trade.316  TPRM 
monitoring is conducted on the basis of a policy statement by the 
member under review and a report prepared by the WTO Secretariat. 
The TPRB’s debate is stimulated by two discussants, selected 
beforehand for this purpose.317  While it had the possibility to include 
RTAs with a common trade policy on its review list, in practice there 
has been little inclination by the TPRB to include RTAs in its 
examination schedule.  In a note dated December 13, 1995, the TPRB 
Chairperson stated that “it should be stressed that individual reviews 
must remain the basis of the TPRM.  There is room for consideration 
of grouping of reviews, where possible; however, at this stage there is 
no support for reviews of regional entities other than the EU.”318  As a 
WTO member, the EU has been subject to TPRM reviews in 1995, 
1997, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2007.319  As regards the other RTAs, only 
the South African Customs Union (in 1998 and 2003) and the WTO 
members of the Organization of East Caribbean States have been 
subject to TPRM review.320  
Proposal: With respect to the monitoring of RTAs after their 
creation, the Doha Round Transparency Mechanism suffers from two 
important shortcomings.  First, the initiative for “subsequent 
notification and reporting of changes” to RTAs essentially remains 
with the parties to regional agreements.  Without regularity in the 
timing of the submission of information and without a detailed 
reporting format, “subsequent notification and reporting” risks 
remaining without practical effect.  The WTO should therefore strive 
for the creation of a regular reporting and updating requirement for 
all RTAs, for instance on a five-year basis.321  Such a requirement 
would help to bring discipline into the permanent monitoring system.  
 
Mechanism, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/idea/ideasheet.display?p_idea_id=57 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2006). 
 316. See WTO, Overseeing National Trade Policies: the TPRM, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_int_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 317. Id. 
 318. WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE, Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism pt III.B.2 ¶ 13 (2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ 
booksp_e/analytic_index_e/tprm_e.htm. 
 319. See WTO, Trade Policy Reviews: The Reviews, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#chronologically (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 320. See id. 
 321. The five-year rule is in line with the proposal by Schott.  Schott, supra note 170, at 18. 
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This should be coupled with a standard reporting format.322  Second, 
the Doha Round Transparency Mechanism fails to set up a proper 
institutional framework for the permanent monitoring of RTAs.  
Practice has shown that, under the currently applicable procedures, 
neither the CRTA nor the TPRB are inclined to devote much time to 
the permanent review of RTAs.  Giving a practical meaning to 
“subsequent notification and reporting,” implies the creation of an 
appropriate institutional mechanism.  This could take the form of a 
subcommittee for the permanent review of RTAs within the CRTA.  
The subcommittee should elect its own chairperson and be equipped 
with its own staff.  Much like the TPRM, permanent review of RTAs 
should be conducted on the basis of a policy statement by the RTA 
that is under review and a report prepared by the WTO Secretariat.  
The review debate should be stimulated by two discussants, selected 
beforehand for this purpose.323 
V.  THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE WTO’S RTA DISCIPLINES: 
AVOIDING “CONSTITUTIONAL OVERSTRETCH” 
In addition to the discussions on the substantive and procedural 
requirements that must be met by RTAs, questions persist on two key 
topics related to the enforcement of WTO disciplines on RTAs.  The 
first question concerns the legal consequences that should result from 
a WTO finding of incompatibility.  The second question deals with 
the justiciability of WTO disciplines on RTAs.  Both issues will be 
discussed below. 
A. The WTO as the “Partial” Constitutional Supervisor of RTAs 
In a leading contribution, Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea 
have underlined the importance of clearly establishing the supremacy 
of WTO law over RTAs.324  They propose “an explicit constitutional 
approach of regulating preferential agreements by and through the 
disciplines of WTO law.”325  Under this approach, regional trade 
agreements that are incompatible with WTO law would either be 
declared null and void ab initio or unlawful under international law, 
 
 322. An adequate format exists on a voluntary basis.  See Comm. on Reg’l Trade 
Agreements, Note by the Chairman: Standard Format for Information on Regional Trade 
Agreements, WT/REG/W/6 (Aug. 15, 1996). 
 323. This would be like the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.  See WTO, supra note 316. 
 324. Cottier & Foltea, supra note 21, at 44. 
 325. Id. at 67. 
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triggering state responsibility.326  However, while elegant from an 
international law perspective, such proposals fail to appreciate the 
limited nature of the WTO.  Although the WTO framework might be 
labeled a constitution, it is only a weak and partial constitution.  On 
the one hand, the WTO is largely confined to trade law and policy 
and is far from a comprehensive legal structure that reflects the 
variety of issues covered by RTAs.  On the other hand, the WTO is 
partial in the sense of being biased in favor of liberal trade values, to 
the detriment of broader societal norms that are often expressed in 
regional agreements.  Failing to properly take these two limitations 
into account might lead to proposals suffering from “constitutional 
overstretch,” thus widening the credibility gap between the WTO’s 
real capabilities and the constitutional expectations. 
While the WTO does have a number of rules on topics that are 
not exclusively trade issues, such as intellectual property rights and 
health and safety measures, its scope of action is roughly limited to 
trade policy.327  The principal mandate of the WTO is, indeed, to 
provide the institutional framework “for the conduct of trade relations 
among its members.”328  RTAs, however, often have broad 
geopolitical, developmental, macroeconomic, social and 
environmental goals, going well beyond trade policy.329  The 
European Community’s vast network of RTAs, for instance, is 
inspired by a combination of geopolitical, developmental and 
commercial objectives.330  The RTAs concluded by the EC can be 
divided into five categories: 
• Free trade deals as part of association agreements that are 
designed to support political and economic reform in the 
 
 326. Id. at 68. 
 327. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline 
of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 666 (2006).  For a comprehensive treatment of the 
WTO’s scope, see generally Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 28 (2002).  See also COTTIER & OESCH, supra note 144, at 83; VAN DEN 
BOSSCHE, supra note 81, at 86. 
 328. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, art. II, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-
wto_e.htm [hereinafter WTO agreement]. 
 329. See generally Louise Fawcett, Regionalism in Historical Perspective, in REGIONALISM 
IN WORLD POLITICS,  REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 9 (Louise 
Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell eds., 1995); THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL TRADING 
BLOCS (Bart Kerremans & Bob Switky eds., 2000). 
 330. For an extensive study of the various dimensions of the RTAs concluded by the EC, 
see generally Marc Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements concluded by the European Community, 
309 RECUEIL DES COURS 125 (2004). 
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post-Cold War countries of Central and Eastern Europe after 
the fall of the Soviet system and to assist them on the way to 
EU membership in areas such as environmental policy, 
consumer protection and social security;331 
• Free trade deals as part of association agreements that are 
designed to support peace and stability in ex-Yugoslavia, 
foster political and economic reform in the associated 
countries, and assist them on the way to potential EU 
membership;332 
• Free trade deals as part of association agreements that are 
designed to foster close and stable political and economic 
relations with immediate neighboring countries in Europe, 
North Africa and the Middle East;333 
• Preferential access as an instrument of economic 
development of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries;334 
• Free trade deals as an instrument of mutually beneficial, 
reciprocal market opening with third countries outside the 
 
 331. See the Europe Association Agreements concluded during the 1990s with the Central 
and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania). These agreements are no longer in 
existence, as all countries listed have become EU member states.  See, for instance, Europe 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part, 1994 O.J. (L 358) 3.  For 
a legal analysis of the Europe Agreements, see Marc Maresceau & Elisabettta Montaguti, The 
Relations between the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: a Legal Appraisal, 32 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1327 (1995). 
 332. See the Stability and Association Agreements concluded with Croatia and Macedonia. 
On the EC’s Stabilization and Association process and the texts of the agreements, see Stability 
and Association Process-Background Documents, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
key_documents/sap_en.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 333. See the Free Trade Agreements of 1972 with the remaining EFTA countries and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.  Association Agreements between the EU and 
its Mediterranean Partners are in force between the EU and Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, 
Egypt and “on an interim basis with the Palestinian Authority.”  See The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership - Association Agreements, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/ 
med_ass_agreemnts.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).  Agreements were signed with Algeria, and 
Lebanon, and negotiations were concluded with Syria.  Id. 
 334. See the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions and Cotonou Agreement with the ACP 
countries.  For the text of the currently applicable Cotonou Convention and its historical 
context, see The Cotonou Agreement, http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
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EU’s traditional geographical scope, often as a reaction to or 
in anticipation of broader geo-economic developments.335 
The EC’s broad political aims in the negotiation of RTAs have 
recently been emphasized by EC Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson when announcing his request to start negotiations with 
ASEAN, India and South Korea.  One of Mandelson’s priorities is to 
use the RTAs as a means “to encourage countries to enforce basic 
labor rights, such as the ILO [International Labor Organization] core 
conventions, along with environmental standards.”336  Political, 
environmental, social and developmental considerations are largely 
beyond the WTO’s strict legal scope. 
The creation of RTAs is, in the first place, a political process that 
often involves trade-related provisions serving non-commercial goals 
such as international peace and human rights.  In political science 
literature, it is frequently argued that RTAs—whether WTO 
compatible or not—“can be a powerful force for peace.”337  The idea 
is that “[b]uilding interdependence between countries, creating 
economic incentives for peace and developing non-military means for 
resolving disputes . . . should help to bind countries’ interests into a 
shared future.”338  Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that 
“preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have come to play a 
significant role in governing state compliance with human rights.”339  
 
 335. See the Bilateral Trade Relations with South Africa, Mexico and Chile at  European 
Commission.  EC, Bilateral Trade Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 336. Press Release, Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, Trade Policy and Decent 
Work (Dec. 5, 2006), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/ 
06/779&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr. 
 337. OLI BROWN ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: PROMOTING CONFLICT OR BUILDING PEACE? (2005), http://www.iisd.org/ 
pdf/2005/security_rta_conflict.pdf. 
 338. Id. at 14.  On the idea that RTAs can help sustain peace, see generally Edward D. 
Mansfield, Preferential Peace: Why Preferential Trading Arrangements Inhibit Interstate Conflict, 
in ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
AN ENDURING DEBATE 222 (Edward D. Mansfield & Brian M. Pollins eds., 2003) (referring to 
“PTAs”); Edward D. Mansfield & Jon C. Pevehouse, Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and 
International Conflict, 54 INT’L ORG. 775 (2000); Edward D. Mansfield & Rachel Bronson, 
Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade Patterns, 91 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 94 (1997); Yoram Z. Haftel, Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, 
Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes, 61 INT’L ORG. 217 (2007); Harry Bliss 
& Bruce Russett, Democracy and Trade: Ties of Interest and Community, in DEMOCRATIC 
PEACE FOR EUROPE: MYTH OR REALITY? 75 (Gustaaf Geeraerts & Patrick Stouthuysen eds., 
1999) (referring to international trade reducing conflict). 
 339. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements 
Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 593 (2005). 
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In particular when they tie trade liberalization benefits to compliance 
with human rights principles, “PTAs are more effective than softer 
human rights agreements (HRAs) in changing repressive 
behaviors.”340  In short, when proposing WTO legality tests on RTAs, 
economists and trade lawyers must be conscious that “trade policy is 
foreign policy.”341  The link between peace, regional integration and 
GATT/WTO law is not merely theoretical. 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), for instance, 
was an explicit and successful attempt to foster the reconciliation 
between France and Germany after World War II.342  Limited to only 
two economic sectors, the ECSC was inconsistent with the 
“substantially all the trade” provisions of GATT Article XXIV.  As 
such, it obtained the necessary GATT waiver,343 and formed the basis 
for the EEC and EU.  These organizations are generally credited with 
having made a crucial contribution to the peace in Western Europe 
since 1945.344  Arguably, the ECSC waiver illustrates the proper and 
flexible functioning of the GATT/WTO system.  However, it is 
necessary to inquire whether it is appropriate to require such RTAs 
as the ESCS to apply for a waiver in the GATT/WTO framework.  
 
 340. Id.  On the EC’s practice of tying the benefits of RTAs to human rights behavior, see 
generally Barbara Brandtner & Allan Rosas, Trade Preferences and Human Rights, in THE EU 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 699 (Philip Alston, Mara Bustelo & James Heenan eds., 1999); Karen E. 
Smith, The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: “Foreign Policy” with an 
Ethical Dimension?, in ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 185 (Karen E. Smith & Margot Light 
eds., 2001). 
 341. See Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy Is Foreign Policy, 9 FOREIGN POLICY 18, 18 
(Winter 1972-1973).  “[H]istorically trade issues frequently intruded into, and occasionally even 
dominated . . . foreign policy among countries.”  Id. at 19.  See generally Richard N. Cooper, 
Trade Policy as Foreign Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 
291 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1988). 
 342. The ECSC was established by the Treaty of Paris (1951) in order to “substitute for 
historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests.”  Treaty Establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community preamble, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.  On the ECSC, see JOHN 
GILLINGHAM, COAL, STEEL AND THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE, 1945-1955: THE GERMANS AND 
FRENCH FROM RUHR CONFLICT TO ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1991); DESMOND DINAN, 
EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 46-57 (2004). 
 343. GATT, Waiver granted in connection with the European Coal and Steel Community 
(Nov. 10, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. 1S/17 (1st Supp.) at 17-22 (1953). 
 344. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Daniel Verdier, European Integration as a Solution to 
War, 11 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 99, 99 (2005).  For the constructive impact of European integration 
on border conflicts, see Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter & Mathias Albert, The European Union 
and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration, 60 INT’L ORG. 563, 563-64 
(2006). 
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Waivers are costly to those who request them.345  As they need to be 
negotiated with the other WTO members, waivers—in GATT/WTO 
tradition—frequently require a quid pro quo in terms of political or 
economic concessions.346  Thus, instead of encouraging its members to 
negotiate ECSC-type agreements, the WTO penalizes those parties 
that follow the Franco-German reconciliation model. 
The limited range of competence of WTO law should lead to 
modesty in proposals for expanded constitutional supervisory powers 
over RTAs.  While the WTO is the appropriate forum for the 
assessment of the trade policy measures of RTAs, it should not be 
burdened with the role of overall constitutional arbiter of the legality 
of RTAs.  Providing the WTO with an overall constitutional 
supervisory role over RTAs would imply that there is a consensus to 
elevate the WTO’s particular underlying normative values—based on 
the “right to trade”—to a rank that is superior to other legal norms.347  
According to Jeffrey L. Dunoff, such a constitutional elevation of 
WTO law would “privilege[] economic rights as opposed to other 
important social interests” and “necessarily limit governments’ ability 
to pursue many non-economic goals, such as environmental 
protection and other social policies.”348  Or, as Robert Howse has 
argued, if there is a conflict of values, it is hardly legitimate to resolve 
these within the trading system, according to its fundamental 
principles.349  It might, for example, be considered whether other U.N. 
bodies are more suitable for examining the contribution that an RTA 
trade policy regime could make to international peace and security.  
A possible procedure could consist of an examination of the peace 
potential of RTAs by the Security Council.  The resulting formal 
declaration by the Security Council would automatically be 
 
 345. On waivers in the WTO context, see COTTIER & OESCH, supra note 144, at 508; 
MATSUSHITA, SCHOENBAUM & MAVROIDIS, supra note 81, at 13. 
 346. Such quid pro quo deals are the essence of what Paul Krugman calls “GATT-think.”  
See Paul Krugman, The Move Toward Free Trade Zones, in POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE 
AND CURRENCY ZONES 7, 26 (1991) (discussing the economic concessions that would be made 
in trade negotiations, as predicted and explained by “GATT-think” principles). 
 347. Dunoff, supra note 327, at 664, 667. 
 348. Id. at 664. 
 349. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy – and Back Again: The Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 105-06 (2002); see also Robert Howse & 
Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a 
Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING 
SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227, 229 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (discussing that 
compromises between competing trade and non-trade-related values should not be made within 
the rules of WTO dispute settlement but, rather, within non-WTO institutions). 
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transformed in a WTO waiver of the trade policy provisions indicated 
by the Council as peace-contributors.  The precise formulation of 
such a mechanism could be a useful topic for further legal research. 
B. The Limited Justiciability of the WTO’s RTA Disciplines 
While the WTO should not be put in charge of judging the 
overall legality of regional agreements, it is the proper framework for 
the supervision of the trade policy measures formulated by RTAs.  A 
key question in this context is the degree of justiciability of disputes 
on the interpretation of the WTO rules on RTAs.  Since the entry 
into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the WTO dispute 
settlement system is operating largely as an independent judicial 
branch.350  Under the old GATT 1947 procedure, the adoption by the 
GATT Council of reports produced by dispute settlement Panels 
required consensus.  In other words, countries that were unhappy 
with the outcome of a case could block the adoption of a ruling.351  In 
contrast with GATT 1947, reports issued by WTO dispute settlement 
Panels and the Appellate Body are automatically adopted unless 
there is an—unlikely—consensus among the members to reject a 
ruling.352  Formally, the function of Panels and the Appellate Body is 
to assist the members in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in 
making recommendations or in giving rulings.353  In practice, the 
“reverse consensus” requirement has ensured that the “judicial” 
organs in the dispute settlement procedure have the last word in 
 
 350. For excellent volumes on the WTO dispute settlement system, see generally REFORM 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Dencho Georgiev & Kim 
Van der Borght eds., 2006); THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: 1995–2003 (Federico 
Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004).  On the judicial independence of the WTO 
dispute settlement system, see Steve Charnovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade 
Organization, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 219 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare 
Romano & Ruth Mackenzie eds., 2002). 
 351. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 60 (1987).  
On the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system, see generally Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute 
Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 145 (1980); 
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993). 
 352. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 arts. 16.4, 
17.14, Legal Instruments – Result of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) 
[herinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
 353. On the “assisting” role of the Panels, see id. arts. 6, 11.  On the role of the Dispute 
Settlement Body, see id. art. 2. 
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giving binding interpretations of the WTO Agreements.354  The 
permanent WTO Appellate Body, in particular, has been identified as 
“the dynamic force behind [WTO] constitution-building by virtue of 
its capacity to generate constitutional norms and structures during 
dispute resolution.”355 
1. GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement and RTAs:  The State-of-
Play.  In the days of the old GATT 1947, the relationship between the 
dispute settlement system and Article XXIV came up in two cases.  In 
1985, the GATT Panel in the EC Mediterranean Citrus case explicitly 
declined to rule on the Article XXIV compatibility of the agreements 
concluded between the EC and several Mediterranean countries.356  
The Panel held that the “examination— or re-examination— of Article 
XXIV agreements was the responsibility of the contracting parties.”357  
The Panel added that “it would not be appropriate to determine the 
conformity of an agreement with the requirements of Article XXIV 
on the basis of a complaint by a contracting party under Article 
XXIII:1(a).”358  It emphasized that such conformity assessments: 
should be done clearly in the context of Article XXIV and not 
Article XXIII, as an assessment of all the duties, regulations of 
commerce and trade coverage as well as the interests and rights of 
all contracting parties were at stake . . . and not just the interests 
and rights of [the] . . . contracting party raising a complaint.359 
In 1993, the GATT 1947 Panel in the Bananas case adopted a 
different logic.360  In response to the European Community’s 
argument that the overall consistency of regional arrangements was 
the subject of examination under Article XXIV:7 and could therefore 
not be investigated under the dispute settlement procedures of 
Article XXIII, the Panel replied that, “notwithstanding the issue of 
 
 354. On the judicial nature of the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally DEBORAH 
Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (John H. 
Jackson ed., 2005). 
 355. Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial 
Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 39, 42 (2001). 
 356. Report of the Panel, European Community – Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus 
Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, ¶ 4.15, L/5776 (Feb. 7, 1985) (not 
adopted), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/english/sulpdf/90080242.pdf [hereinafter 
Panel Report EC – Mediterranean Citrus]. 
 357. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. See Panel Report Bananas II, supra note 178. 
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whether the procedures of Article XXIV:7 supersede those of Article 
XXIII:2, it would first have to examine whether the Lomé 
Convention is an agreement of the type to which the procedures of 
Article XXIV:7 apply.”361  The Panel’s reasoning runs as follows: 
The Panel could not accept that tariff preferences inconsistent with 
Article I:1 would, by notification of the preferential arrangement 
and invocation of Article XXIV against the objections of other 
contracting parties, escape any examination by a panel established 
under Article XXIII. If this view were endorsed a mere 
communication of a contracting party invoking Article XXIV could 
deprive all other contracting parties of their procedural rights 
under Article XXIII:2 and therefore also of the effective protection 
of their substantive rights, in particular those under Article I. The 
Panel concluded therefore that a panel, faced with the invocation of 
Article XXIV, first had to examine whether or not this provision 
applied to the agreement in question.362 
In the framework of the Uruguay Round, the negotiators agreed to 
make explicit that the WTO’s dispute settlement provisions “may be 
invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of 
those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free 
trade areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of a 
customs union or a free trade area.”363  As a consequence, the WTO 
Appellate Body has given clear signals that the judicial organs in the 
dispute settlement process are capable of judging on the WTO 
compatibility of RTAs.364  In the Turkey-Textiles case, the Appellate 
Body explicitly referred to the absence of an assessment by the Panel 
on the compatibility of the EC-Turkey customs union with the 
requirements of Article XXIV:5(a) and 8(a).365  While the issue was 
not appealed, the Appellate Body strongly hinted that Panels are 
entitled to judge RTAs on their overall compatibility with Article 
XXIV.366  In the same logic, the Panel in the United States-Line Pipe 
case did explicitly consider that: 
the information provided by the United States in these proceedings, 
the information submitted by the NAFTA parties to the 
 
 361. Id. ¶¶ 158-59. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Final Act, supra note 1, ¶ 12. 
 364. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, ¶ 7.144, WT/DS202/R (Oct. 29, 2001), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/202r_a_e.pdf [hereinafter Panel Report 
on Line Pipe]. 
 365. See Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 60. 
 366. See Kessie, supra note 207. 
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Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (‘CRTA’) (which the 
United States has incorporated into its submission to the Panel by 
reference), and the absence of effective refutation by Korea 
establishes the prima facie case that NAFTA is in conformity with 
Article XXIV:5(b) and (c), and with Article XXIV:8(b).367 
In fact, the Appellate Body has done more than suggesting that the 
conformity of RTAs can be assessed in the framework of WTO 
dispute settlement.  In the Turkey-Textiles case, it emphasized that 
the demonstration by RTAs of their overall compatibility with Article 
XXIV constitutes an essential condition if such regional arrangements 
want to maintain a measure that is otherwise inconsistent with other 
GATT provisions.368  In the words of the Appellate Body: 
[W]e are of the view that Article XXIV may justify a measure 
which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions.  
However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this 
“defence” is available only when two conditions are fulfilled.  First, 
the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that 
the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of [the] . . . 
customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 
8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV.  And, second, that party must 
demonstrate that the formation of [a] customs union would be 
prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at 
issue.”369 
Knowing that the CRTA is politically paralyzed and will therefore 
not provide the parties with solid conclusions on the conformity of 
RTAs, the test imposed by the Appellate Body seems intended to 
strengthen the role of the dispute settlement mechanisms in 
controlling the compatibility of RTAs.  In the absence of a political 
decision, it is in the dispute settlement context that RTAs will have to 
deliver proof of their compatibility. 
According to the dispute settlement Panels, the absence of 
operational conclusions by the CRTA does not, in itself, constitute a 
definitive indication of the (in)compatibility of an RTA.  In the 
Turkey-Textiles case, the Panel rejected the argument that the 
absence of recommendations by the CRTA constituted an implicit 
acceptance of the EC-Turkey customs union.370  In the United States-
Line Pipe case, Korea’s position was that, in the absence of CRTA 
 
 367. Panel Report on Line Pipe, supra note 364, ¶ 7.144. 
 368. Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 58. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Panel Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶¶ 9.172–9.174. 
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approval, NAFTA should be presumed as inconsistent with the WTO 
rules.371  The Panel refuted the Korean argument.  It held as follows: 
[W]e do not consider that the fact that the CRTA has not yet issued 
a final decision that NAFTA is in compliance with Article XXIV:8 
is sufficient to rebut the prima facie case established by the United 
States [on NAFTA’s compliance].  Korea’s argument is based on 
the premise that a regional trade arrangement is presumed 
inconsistent with Article XXIV until the CRTA makes a 
determination to the contrary.  We see no basis for such a premise 
in the relevant provisions of the Agreement establishing the 
WTO.372 
2. The Justiciability of the WTO’s RTA Disciplines.  It is 
important to analyze whether the current state of the WTO case-law 
constitutes an appropriate answer to the credibility gap with regards 
to the monitoring of RTAs.  In the highly political context 
surrounding the creation of regional agreements, the most pertinent 
question concerns the justiciability of the WTO disciplines on RTAs 
and the possible impact of an over-legalization of the enforcement of 
the rules.  The issue will be looked at from three related angles: the 
rather vague nature of the WTO provisions on RTAs; the 
institutional balance on which the WTO rests; and the difference 
between judging concrete trade policy “measures” versus the overall 
legality of RTAs. 
a. The Nature of the WTO’s RTA Provisions.  As it is explained 
in the literature on compliance with international legal norms, the 
substantive characteristics of treaties are among the most important 
predicting factors affecting effective implementation.373  Duties of a 
general and imprecise nature that leave a large margin of 
interpretation are much less likely to be correctly implemented than 
precise obligations that are tested on their simplicity in 
implementation.  Furthermore, the interpretation of imprecise 
provisions by adjudicating bodies is generally controversial.374  There 
is little doubt that WTO’s current rules on RTAs are characterized by 
a general lack of precision.375  Frieder Roessler, the former Director of 
GATT’s Legal Service, has underlined that even crucial trade policy 
 
 371. Panel Report on Line Pipe, supra note 364, Annex B-7, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/202r_c_e.pdf. 
 372. Panel Report on Line Pipe, supra note 364, ¶ 7.144. 
 373. See sources cited supra note 31. 
 374. See generally Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 32. 
 375. See supra Part III. 
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aspects of RTAs have remained undefined.  In his opinion, “[t]he 
Contracting Parties have deliberately never defined the degree of 
trade integration required by Article XXIV.”376  In addition, central 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV involve the highly disputed 
quantification of terms as the general incidence of the duties and 
regulations of commerce and substantially all the trade.  Economists, 
lawyers and practitioners have emphasized that there is just no way to 
predict in mathematical terms and with any degree of precision and 
consensus the future economic impact of RTAs.377  As correctly stated 
by Roessler, it is inappropriate to make the legal status of RTAs 
dependent on such shaky provisions and controversial calculations.378 
The Appellate Body, in the Turkey-Textiles case, has taken 
another course of action.  With its ruling, the Appellate Body has not 
only given an expansive interpretation of the tasks of the WTO’s 
judicial bodies as regards the legality of RTAs, it is also signaling a 
willingness to enter into judicial lawmaking “in areas that had been 
the subject of diplomatic deadlock.”379  The position by the Appellate 
Body should be deplored.  First, the dispute settlement system is 
intended to “to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under 
the covered agreements.”380  Dispute settlement recommendations 
and rulings “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.”381  In combination with the 
structural imprecision in the wording of the WTO rules on RTAs, the 
prohibition for Panels and the Appellate Body to add or diminish 
rights and obligations of members should inspire them to great 
restraint.  Indeed, in view of the lack of precision in the wording of 
the WTO provisions on RTAs, “a panel that rules on this matter 
would . . . be acting without any prior normative guidance.”382  
Second, “judicial overreaching” by the WTO Appellate Body should 
be discouraged as it contributes to undermine the WTO’s 
 
 376. Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Political Organs 
of the WTO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 332 (M. Bronckers & R. 
Quick eds., 2000). 
 377. See supra notes 222-28 and the accompanying text. 
 378. Roessler, supra note 376, at 313 
 379. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 251 (2004). 
 380. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 352, art. 3.2. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Roessler, supra note 376, at 332. 
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legitimacy.383  When confronted with cases where there is a gap in the 
law or where the law is manifestly unclear, the Appellate Body should 
explicitly recognize this and abstain from pronouncing itself, rather 
than trying to fill the blanks.384 
b. Preserving the WTO’s Institutional Balance.  An important 
additional reason for the restraint of the WTO judicial organs is the 
need to preserve the WTO’s institutional balance between political 
and judicial bodies.  According to Roessler, the framers of the WTO 
negotiated a complex institutional structure “under which separate 
judicial and political bodies” were created.385  Referring to the “trias 
politica of modern states,” Roessler makes a distinction between: 
• The WTO’s legislative branch: the membership of the WTO 
acting collectively under the amendment and other rule-
making provisions; 
• The WTO’s executive branch: the political organs of the 
WTO taking decisions within the framework of the existing 
law, including the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements and the Committee on Balance-of-Payments 
Restrictions; and 
• The WTO’s judicial branch: the Panels, arbitrators and the 
Appellate Body.386 
For Roessler, it is evident that “[j]ust as modern states, the WTO 
must ensure that its judicial organs exercise their powers with due 
regard to the jurisdiction assigned to the other parts of its institutional 
structure.”387  In the words of the representative of India, during the 
dispute on its quantitative restrictions maintained for balance-of-
payments reasons, “there is a principle of institutional balance which 
requires panels, in determining the scope of their competence, to take 
into account the competence conferred upon other organs of the 
 
 383. See Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 349, at 227; Steinberg, supra note 379, at 251; see 
generally Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US-Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the 
WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 196 (2006). 
 384. See Charnovitz, supra note 350, at 233 (noting a “true lacuna of law might justify a 
holding of non liquet”).  For the opposite view, see William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System Exceeded its Authority?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79, 106 (2001).  For a detailed 
comment on the possibility for WTO Panels and the Appellate Body to declare a non liquet, see 
Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 861, 873 (2004). 
 385. Roessler, supra note 376, at 325. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 326. 
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WTO.”388  The Panel in the Textiles-Turkey case accepted the 
principle of the separation of powers and did not want to enter into 
the politics of assessing the EC-Turkey customs union.  The Panel 
justified its view as follows: 
As to the . . . question of how far-reaching a panel’s examination 
should be of the regional trade agreement underlying the 
challenged measure, we note that the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (CRTA) has been established, inter alia, to 
assess the GATT/WTO compatibility of regional trade agreements 
entered into by Members, a very complex undertaking which 
involves consideration by the CRTA, from the economic, legal and 
political perspectives of different Members, of the numerous facets 
of a regional trade agreement in relation to the provisions of the 
WTO.  It appears to us that the issue regarding the GATT/WTO 
compatibility of a customs union, as such, is generally a matter for 
the CRTA since, as noted above, it involves a broad multilateral 
assessment of any such customs union, i.e. a matter which concerns 
the WTO membership as a whole.389 
As signaled above, the Appellate Body did not agree with the Panel’s 
reasoning on this point.390  For the Appellate Body, an assessment of 
the overall compatibility of RTAs is entirely within the jurisdiction of 
the dispute settlement organs.391  In the words of Lorand Bartels, the 
attitude of the Appellate Body can be summarized as a “rejection of 
the principle of ‘institutional balance.’”392  While the Appellate Body’s 
ruling has been supported in the academic literature, its wisdom is 
highly questionable.393  First, it is doubtful whether Panels are 
technically equipped to make an overall assessment of the 
compatibility of RTAs with the WTO disciplines.  In view of the 
paralysis of the CRTA, it is unlikely that Panels—when examining 
the overall compatibility of the RTA—will be able to base their 
rulings on clear decisions adopted by the members.  Panels would 
thus need to rule on the overall compatibility of RTAs in line with 
their own assessment.  It is entirely unclear how Panels would 
approach such a daunting task as their rulings would go well beyond 
 
 388. Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, 
Textile and Industrial Products, ¶ 98, WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999) (adopted Sept. 22, 1999), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/90abr.pdf. 
 389. Panel Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 9.52. 
 390. Appellate Body Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶ 58-60. 
 391. See Roessler, supra note 376, at 337; Bartels supra note 384, at 879; Davey, supra note 
384, at 87. 
 392. Bartels, supra note 384, at 878. 
 393. For a generally positive attitude towards the Appellate Body’s reasoning, see Davey, 
supra note 384, at 86; MATSUSHITA, SCHOENBAUM & MAVROIDIS, supra note 81, at 556. 
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the interpretation of a WTO rule in a precise case.  Second, if Panels 
logically examine RTAs from a narrow legal perspective, they would 
neglect the political and economic considerations of RTAs that were 
correctly recognized as significant by the Panel in the Turkey-Textiles 
case.394  Third, as the WTO’s substantive rules on RTAs are vague, 
Panels would have to pass their judgment “without having received 
any prior normative guidance from the WTO membership and 
therefore engage essentially in a legislative or political task.”395  
Fourth, there is a problem of political acceptability of dispute 
settlement rulings on the legality of RTAs, especially in view of the 
vague substantive criteria.  As the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
states have specifically argued during the Doha Round, the 
jurisdiction of the CRTA to determine the WTO compatibility of 
RTAs should not be unduly overridden by the dispute settlement 
procedures and rulings.396  In more theoretical terms, Joost Pauwelyn 
has expressed the problem as follows: 
[K]nowing that legalization or increased discipline unequivocally 
calls for more politics and expression of voice or participation, the 
harder law solution would only worsen, not resolve, the current 
deadlock in the political, rulemaking process: countries would insist 
even more on their veto rights.  Moreover, since harder law or 
more discipline cannot be sustained without more political support 
or more politics, it is highly questionable, as things stand today, that 
sufficient political support – be it at the state or broader societal 
level – is available to make such further legalization digestible . . . It 
risks rather serious pressure on the exit side: . . . WTO members, 
especially the most powerful ones, could walk away from their 
obligations. This, in turn, may undermine, rather than strengthen, 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the trade regime.397 
Finally, it is entirely unclear what the consequences would be of a 
WTO dispute settlement ruling that effectively declares an RTA 
incompatible with the WTO laws.  The repercussions for the global 
trading system, for the law produced in the framework of the RTA 
and for the trade policies of its member states would unquestionably 
be serious.  In view of the arguments underlined by Pauwelyn and the 
high political stakes of some RTAs, it is not unlikely that members 
would consciously decide to disregard a dispute settlement ruling.  It 
 
 394. Panel Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶¶ 9.52-9.53. 
 395. Roessler, supra note 376, at 344. 
 396. Negotiating Group on Rules, Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the ACP 
Group of States, ¶ 3, TN/RL/W/155 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
 397. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 51 (2005). 
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is interesting, in this context, to recall the experience of the American 
trade negotiators when examining the compatibility of the Treaty of 
Rome that created the European Economic Community with the 
GATT.  According to Isaiah Frank, the Chair of the U.S. delegation 
during the examination, the Europeans considered the Community of 
such vital importance that “if the Six [member states] had to choose 
between renegotiating the Treaty and being formally declared in 
violation of the GATT, they would undoubtedly have let the GATT 
go.”398 
c. Judging Concrete Trade Policy “Measures” Versus the 
Overall Legality of RTAs.  In contrast with the Appellate Body, the 
Panel in the Turkey-Textiles case has taken a more modest, but more 
realistic and more sustainable approach in assessing complaints 
against the trade policy measures adopted by RTAs.  The Panel 
underlined that its mission was to express itself on the compatibility 
of concrete trade policy “measures”: 
[W]e understand from the wording of paragraph 12 of the WTO 
Understanding on Article XXIV, that panels have jurisdiction to 
examine “any matters ‘arising from’ the application of those 
provisions of Article XXIV.”  For us, this confirms that a panel can 
examine the WTO compatibility of one or several measures 
“arising from” Article XXIV types of agreement . . . . Thus, we 
consider that a panel can assess the WTO compatibility of any 
specific measure adopted by WTO Members . . . on the occasion of 
the formation of a customs union . . . . As to whether panels also 
have the jurisdiction to assess the overall WTO compatibility of a 
customs union, we recall that the Appellate Body stated that the 
terms of reference of panels must refer explicitly to the 
“measures” . . . all of which could potentially be examined by 
panels, before, during or after . . . CRTA examination, if the 
requirements laid down in the DSU [Dispute Settlement 
Understanding] are met.  However, it is arguable that a customs 
union (or a free-trade area) as a whole would logically not be a 
“measure” as such, subject to challenge under the DSU.399 
 
 398. ISAIAH FRANK, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: AN ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL 
POLICY 164 (1961).  A similar statement was made by Gardner Patterson, former Deputy 
Director General of the GATT.  He claimed that “the GATT itself probably would have been 
destroyed” if there had been a serious attempt to block the progress of the European Economic 
Community on the basis of the legal requirements of GATT Article XXIV.  See GARDNER 
PATTERSON, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE POLICY ISSUES, 1945-1965, at 
263 (1966). 
 399. Panel Report on Turkey-Textiles, supra note 35, ¶¶ 9.50, 9.51, 9.53 (emphasis added). 
01__DEVUYST_SERDAREVIC.DOC 5/27/2008  1:26:36 PM 
2007] BRIDGING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CREDIBILITY GAP 71 
As such, the Panel simply focused on whether Turkey was 
permitted to introduce the quantitative restrictions that were attacked 
by India.  The Panel particularly examined whether the wording of 
Article XXIV authorized a departure from the obligations contained 
in GATT Articles XI and XIII.400  In comparison with the complex 
legal reasoning established by the Appellate Body, the Panel’s logic is 
superior.  The legal test set by the Panel is considerably more 
straightforward than the reasoning of the Appellate Body and has 
greater legitimacy as it is not based on elaborate judicial rule-making.  
Furthermore, the Panel’s focus on concrete trade policy measures is 
more suited to the expertise and competence of dispute settlement 
Panels. 
Proposal: Following the logic of the Panel Report in the Turkey-
Textiles case, this article proposes that, during the enforcement 
exercise, a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, the 
legality of the regional arrangement as such and, on the other hand, 
the legality of concrete trade policy measures adopted by the RTA.  
The latter should be subject of strict surveillance and sanctioning, 
notably via WTO dispute settlement.  In contrast to the line taken by 
the WTO’s Appellate Body, it would, however, not be advisable for 
the WTO dispute settlement system to get into questions of the 
overall legality of specific regional arrangements.  The overall 
compatibility of regional arrangements with WTO rules is better 
suited for diplomatic transparency and peer review exercises in the 
CRTA on the basis of the clarified benchmarks, as proposed in Part 
III of this article. 
According to Roessler, it is clear—already at this stage—that the 
dispute settlement process may only be invoked with respect to 
“specific measures” imposed by RTAs.401  Following the 
interpretation of the Panel in the Turkey-Textiles case, he is of the 
opinion that the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV is 
sufficiently precise.  The Understanding states that the WTO dispute 
settlement procedures may be invoked “with respect to any matters 
arising from the application of” the Article XXIV provisions.402  
According to Roessler, “[t]he ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term 
‘application’ is ‘a specific use or purpose for which something is put’ 
 
 400. Id. ¶ 9.134. 
 401. Roessler, supra note 376, at 330-31. 
 402. Final Act, supra note 1, ¶ 12. 
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and ‘applicability in a particular case.’”403  This, in his view, “suggests 
that panels can only make findings on specific measures imposed.”404  
William J. Davey, another former Director of the WTO Legal Affairs 
Division, disagrees with Roessler’s interpretation.  According to 
Davey, the “ordinary meaning” of the Uruguay Round 
Understanding “clearly demonstrates that there is a broad grant of 
authority to dispute settlement panels.”405  He adds the Uruguay 
Round Understanding was particularly “not intended to restrict the 
power of panels as compared to GATT practice.”406  However, “given 
the complexity” of the overall compatibility assessment of RTAs with 
the WTO disciplines, Davey nevertheless believes that “it would be 
preferable for panels to avoid that issue where possible.”407  The fact 
that Panel and Appellate Body have disagreed over this issue and 
that it also divides the most knowledgeable WTO scholars and former 
practitioners is an indication that the state of the law is unclear.  The 
Uruguay Round Understanding on the interpretation of Article 
XXIV should therefore be amended to express with greater precision 
that the WTO’s dispute settlement provisions may be invoked with 
respect to any specific measure adopted by WTO members or by an 
RTA under the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V 
and the Enabling Clause. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is hard to deny that the current WTO regime for RTAs is a 
failure.  Since its creation in 1996, paralysis has reigned in the CRTA.  
In the mean time, the world outside the WTO headquarters has 
witnessed a proliferation in the number of RTAs.  The paralysis in 
the WTO’s assessment of RTAs has been carried over from the 
GATT 1947 to the WTO.  In spite of the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on GATT Article XXIV, the parties have failed to 
resolve fundamental differences in the interpretation of the 
multilateral RTA rules.  The creation of the CRTA as the single body 
in charge of examining RTAs notified under GATT and GATS did 
not help to untangle the knot.  This is not unexpected as the CRTA is 
 
 403. Roessler, supra note 376, at 330. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Davey, supra note 384, at 86. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
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charged with applying rules that continue to form the subject of a 
bitter debate among WTO members. 
During the Doha Round, the negotiators decided to focus in the 
first place on the improvement of the transparency procedures with 
respect to RTAs.  The principle of transparency stands high in the 
hierarchy of WTO norms.408  The Doha Round Transparency 
Mechanism for RTAs, which was provisionally put into force in 
December 2006, includes a number of useful innovations, notably on 
the role of the WTO Secretariat in the examination of RTAs.  The 
Transparency Mechanism is not, however, without shortcomings.  Its 
most important flaw concerns the lack of an effective monitoring of 
RTAs after their formal notification.  Such permanent monitoring is 
important as their practical effect on the multilateral trade system can 
hardly be studied upon their formation.  Still, the Transparency 
Mechanism fails to set up a proper institutional framework for the 
continuous monitoring of RTAs.  This deficiency should be rectified 
by incorporating an appropriate review procedure in the 
Transparency Mechanism along the lines of the successful TPRM 
practice. 
The new procedural rules of the Transparency Mechanism are, 
however, likely to remain without much impact as long as a host of 
substantive legal problems continue to hinder their smooth 
implementation.  Already in 1975, the Chairman of the GATT 
Working Group on the examination of the European Community’s 
enlargement with the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
explicitly declared that the vagueness and ambiguities of the 
provisions of Article XXIV fostered methodological disagreements.  
While emphasizing the necessity of a formal clarification of Article 
XXIV’s provisions, the Chairman concluded that the GATT itself was 
an important contributing factor to the deadlocks in the Working 
Groups.409  More than twenty-five years later the interpretations of 
essential terms such as “substantially all trade” and “other regulations 
of commerce” remain “the subjects of lengthy discussions . . . without 
any sign of consensus being reached, and without sign of . . . 
willingness on the part of some to engage in the exercise.”410  Part III 
of this article has tried to formulate a number of realistic, pragmatic 
 
 408. See sources cited supra note 255. 
 409. See GATT Council, Minutes of the Meeting, at §§ 3-5, C/M/107 (July 25, 1975). 
 410. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meetings of 6-7 and 10 July, ¶ 
48, WT/REG/M/18 (July 22, 1998). 
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solutions to the major substantive problem points.  The main 
recommendation is that the Doha Round negotiators should abandon 
the unfruitful path of trying to attach legal consequences to uncertain 
results of overall economic assessments of RTAs, involving the 
quantification and aggregation of duties and other regulations of 
commerce.  Instead, the WTO assessment of RTAs should 
concentrate on concrete and tangible trade policy measures and their 
compatibility with the WTO rules.  Such a surveillance process should 
not be limited, however, to the first stage of RTAs, but should be 
pursued through their existence via the creation of an effective and 
permanent monitoring mechanism for RTAs. 
Some legal scholars have made more sophisticated proposals to 
provide the WTO with an overall role in deciding the legality of 
RTAs as such.  These proposals risk contributing to the WTO’s 
constitutional credibility gap rather than helping resolve it.  First, 
such suggestions make little sense without substantially clarified and 
simplified substantive rules for RTAs.  Second, they do not 
sufficiently take into account the limited—or “partial”—nature of the 
WTO constitution.  Realistic proposals on the improvement of the 
WTO’s role with regard to the surveillance of RTAs must take into 
consideration that regional arrangements often have several broad 
objectives—including peace and security—going well beyond trade.  
In that context, it hardly seems appropriate to request that the 
WTO—as organisation based on a partial set of trade rules—assumes 
the role of ultimate arbiter on the overall legality of RTAs.  The key 
issue, however, is whether the WTO, and in particular its dispute 
settlement system, will have the capacity to resist, what Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff calls, “an expansionist, perhaps even imperialist, view of the 
trade system.”411 
In view of the vague wording of the WTO provisions on RTAs 
and the need to preserve the institutional balance on which the WTO 
rests, the in-depth analysis of the justiciability of the WTO disciplines 
on RTAs, described in Part V, leads to the conclusion that a 
distinction must be made between the enforcement of concrete trade 
policy “measures” and judging the overall legality of RTAs. 
Following the logic of the Panel in the Turkey-Textiles case, concrete 
trade policy measures should be subject to strict surveillance and 
sanctioning, notably via WTO dispute settlement. However, in 
contrast with the reasoning of the WTO’s Appellate Body, it would 
 
 411. Dunoff, supra note 327, at 667. 
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be counterproductive for the credibility of the WTO and for the long-
term effectiveness of the multilateral trade disciplines if the WTO 
dispute settlement organs were to get into questions of the overall 
legality of specific regional arrangements.  The overall compatibility 
of regional arrangements with WTO rules should rather be the 
subject of improved transparency and diplomatic peer review on the 
basis of the strengthened benchmarks proposed in Part III. 
